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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

UNRAVELING THE BANNER:
A BIOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF STEPAN BANDERA

BY

PAUL STEPAN PIRIE ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1993

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Unraveling the Banner: A Biographical Study of Stepan Bandera* submitted by Paul S. Pirie in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a biographical study of the twentieth-century Ukrainian nationalist, Stepan Bandera. The study has two basic purposes. On the one hand it seeks to provide a survey and an examination of his political activities from the 1920s until his death in 1959. Bandera's terrorist activities during the 1930s, his trial as leader of the Western Ukrainian branch of the outlawed Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, his rise to the leadership of the OUN, and his attempts to establish a Ukrainian state in 1941 are all examined. On the other hand, the thesis considers Bandera's importance as a symbol in Ukrainian history and as a creator of symbols. The study demonstrates how the Soviet state used the symbol of Bandera to support their campaign against expressions of Ukrainian national consciousness, and how Bandera's supporters endeavored to create a Bandera Myth after his death in order to support their own political agenda. The thesis concludes that he is likely to serve as an enduring figure in Ukrainian history, in part because his symbol bolsters and serves as a vehicle for communicating a nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian history. Most importantly, his memory will endure because his life story may be readily fashioned into the type of hero-myth common to all peoples and ages.

PREFACE

On 15 October 1959 Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), arrived home at his apartment in Munich carrying a bag of groceries. He fumbled with his keys at the door to the building, as a man walked towards him. "Isn't it working?" the man asked. "Yes, it's all right!" replied Bandera. Stepping past the OUN leader the man fired a cyanide pistol --- specially designed by the KGB --- into Bandera's face. Bandera collapsed to the ground and was found five minutes later by neighbours, who heard moans from the hallway. They called the dying man's wife, who was home at the time. She in turn called for an ambulance. He died in the ambulance on the way to the hospital.[1]

As Time magazine reported a fortnight later, for most of his life, Bandera was an "angry, fanatic outcast, dedicated to a lost cause. His cause was Ukrainian nationalism, and so hard did Bandera struggle for it that Soviet propaganda refers to all members of the Ukrainian underground as "Banderovtsy."[2] At his funeral in Munich, which was attended by Ukrainian nationalists from around the world, Bandera was declared a Ukrainian martyr, a symbol of the nation and of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle.[3] Two years later, Bohdan Stashyns'kyi, the KGB agent who had assassinated Bandera, defected to West Germany and confessed to the murder of Bandera, and of another leading

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[1] The murder of Bandera is recounted in great detail in Karl Anders, Murder to Order (London, 1965). A reprint of this work is found in The Ukrainian Review, vol. XXII, no. 1 (Spring, 1975) pp. 101-108 and vol. XXII, no. 2 (Summer, 1975) pp. 26-57.

[2] "The Partisan," Time (Canada Edition), vol. LXXIV, no. 18. (2 November, 1959).

[3] See Danylo Chaikovs'kyi Moskovs'ki vbyvtsi Bandery pered sudom (Russian murderers of Bandera before the court) (Munich, 1965). This book, which was published by Bandera's party, is extremely comprehensive, and includes a collection of essays dealing with Bandera's assassination, as well as a survey of various articles written by the world press on the occasion of Bandera's murder. It also provides an exhaustive list of all of the newspapers and journals which reported Bandera's assassination and the ensuing trial of his assassin (pp. 655-682), pp. 481-491.

Ukrainian nationalist, Professor Lev Rebet. In the testimony he gave at the trial, Stashins'kyi recounted in vivid detail the training he had received, the planning and the execution of the assassination of Bandera. In the end the judge declared that the government of the Soviet Union, which had institutionalized political murder, was the main culprit. It is now known that Nikita Khrushchev had personally authorized the attack.[4] The negative publicity generated by the trial was so great that following Bandera's assassination, the KGB largely abandoned political assassination as an instrument of policy outside of the Soviet bloc.[5]

Bandera's dramatic death was a fitting conclusion to a life filled with drama and intrigue. The trial, which served as a potent indictment of the Soviet state, was also a fitting epitaph for Bandera, for, throughout his life, he had worked tirelessly to denounce the Soviet Union, and to spread the ideas of Ukrainian nationalism.[6] Tried as a terrorist in the 1930s, Bandera had used his trial as a forum to denounce the Soviet Union.

Since his death there have been three major interpretations of Bandera's life, each representing a distinct political grouping: that of his supporters and party; that of Ukrainian nationalists who were in opposition to Bandera; and that of the Soviet propagandists.[7] According to Bandera's party, and his numerous supporters in the Ukrainian emigration, Bandera was virtually a saint: he was the quintessential leader of the Ukrainian nation. In contrast to this view, in the eyes of Bandera's Ukrainian nationalist political opponents (and there were many), Bandera was a misguided, egotistical zealot, who may have had

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[4] See, Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev (London, 1990), p. 385.

[5] Ibid., p. 386.

[6] Transcripts of the trial of Bandera's murderer are found (in Ukrainian) in Chaikovs'kyi Moskovs'ki vbyvtsi Bandery, pp. 153-339.

[7] The views of these various camps concerning Bandera will be discussed throughout this work. The views of the nationalist-Ukrainian opponents of Bandera are discussed in Chapter III, while the Soviet interpretation of Bandera is one of the topics of Chapter IV.

Ukraine's national interests in mind, but he ultimately did more harm than good. Soviet journalists during and following the Second World War maintained that Bandera was a traitor and a bandit of the lowest and most despicable order. Indeed, in post-war Soviet Ukraine, Bandera was the very incarnation of evil, and of opposition to the Soviet state. Bandera's assassination has been recounted in great detail in English, but his life has not been the subject of an English language study, although he has been mentioned briefly in a number of works.[8] Therefore, one purpose of this study is to provide a basic outline of the life of this controversial figure in Ukrainian history to the English speaking reader.

Since the era of reform in the Soviet Union which began in the mid-1980s, a new body of literature devoted to examining Stepan Bandera's life has appeared: the works of those in Ukraine seeking to rehabilitate him, and the works of those seeking to counter these efforts. This study seeks neither to rehabilitate nor to denounce Bandera. Rather, the intent is to understand Bandera as a human being, and his importance in Ukrainian history. One must examine the forces, both political and intellectual, which moulded his outlook. To understand Bandera's place in history, one must not only consider his importance as a political figure in Ukrainian history, but also his importance as a symbol. In many ways Bandera's significance in history is primarily as a symbol. The second and third chapters examine Bandera's political activities: the former considers his work as a propagandist and terrorist in the 1930s, while the latter examines his activities during the Second World War. The fourth and final chapter discusses Bandera's role as a symbol in Ukrainian history, and considers how and why his party and the Soviet state constructed mythological images of Bandera, and evaluates the importance of these myths.

Stepan Bandera's life was so full of drama and intrigue, and was so bound up with the intricate and perplexing convolutions characteristic of the political history of this turbulent period, that it would be very easy to become mired in a sea of anecdotes, details and explanations. Moreover, there has been such a large body of polemical literature produced by the Ukrainian nationalist emigre community, that it would also be easy to be diverted by polemical battles. While it is impossible to avoid these obstacles completely, it is hoped that this study has not strayed too much in its primary tasks: providing an introduction to the dramatic life of twentieth-century Ukraine's most controversial figure, and helping to understand why the name Stepan Bandera still kindles such fierce and contradictory emotions in the hearts of so many Ukrainians.

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[8] See for example, John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (3rd edition) (Englewood, Colorado, 1990) and Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945 (New York, 1957).

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CHAPTER I

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1919-1929

Background to the Inter-war Period in Western Ukraine

The economic and political turmoil in Europe after 1918 gave impetus to a variety of right-wing movements including Fascism, National Socialism, and integral nationalism. These ideologies were especially fuelled by the onset of economic depression after 1929, and by the rising antagonism between the capitalist and communist worlds. They were also fuelled by particular national grievances. In Germany resentment over the harsh terms of the Versailles peace treaty, which required Germany to accept the blame for the war and pay heavy reparations to the victorious Allies, assisted the rise of National Socialism. In Italy bitterness over that country's failure to realize any tangible benefits from her wartime participation facilitated the rise of Fascism in that country.

In the case of Ukraine, its national grievance was much more conspicuous: it had failed in its bid for statehood. After the collapse of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires, Ukraine enjoyed a brief period of independence.[1] Actually, two Ukrainian states were formed: in the Ukrainian lands of the Austrian Empire, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, the West Ukrainian Peoples' Republic was established under the leadership of Ievhen Petrushevych. In Eastern Ukraine (i.e., Ukrainian territories of the defunct Russian Empire) a number of successive governments were also set up. Immediately after the collapse of the Tsarist regime in Russia, the Central Rada (council), led by the renowned Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, was organized as a representative organ of the Ukrainian people. As the weakness of the Russian Provisional Government became evident, the Rada issued its First Universal (manifesto) which stated the Ukrainian people's right to self-government, but refrained from proclaiming the separation of Ukraine from Russia.

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[1] The standard work of this period in Ukrainian history is John Reshetar's The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920: A Study in Nationalism (Princeton, 1952). See also Taras Hunczak (ed.), The Ukraine, 1917-1921: A Study in Revolution. (Cambridge, MA, 1977).

When the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia in October 1917, they had very little support in Ukraine; they were a party of the Russian proletariat. Recognizing their weakness, the Bolsheviks decided to maintain good relations with the Central Rada. On 22 November, the Central Rada declared itself the highest authority in the land in the Third Universal. A month later the Bolsheviks invaded Ukraine. With defeat imminent, the Central Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian People's Republic as a completely independent state on 22 January 1918. Fortunately for the Rada, however, its representatives were present at the peace negotiations then underway between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Central Powers. On 9 February, shortly before the news arrived that the Rada had abandoned Kiev to the Bolsheviks, the Rada's representatives signed a treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, guaranteeing the provision of foodstuffs to the latter in exchange for military support. Consequently, the Soviets were forced to abandon Ukraine to the Germans and Austrians, who marched into Ukraine with an army of over 450,000 shortly after the conclusion of the treaty.

Unhappy with the state of chaos prevalent in Ukraine, the Central Powers overthrew the Rada government, replacing it with a German-backed regime under the leadership of Hetman Pavlo Skoropads'kyi. This regime was itself overthrown in late 1918 when German troops withdrew from Ukraine. It was at this time that the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic was formed under the leadership of Symon Petliura, a Ukrainian politician of moderate socialist leanings. In 1919, amid great celebrations and ceremonies throughout the land, the Ukrainian Peoples' Republic and the West Ukrainian Peoples' Republic united into one state.

The euphoria of this unification process was not long lived, however, since war with Soviet Russia soon began anew. After a bloody and protracted struggle, during the course of which the Ukrainian capital of Kiev changed hands several times, the territories of Eastern Ukraine came once again under the control of Lenin's Bolshevik party; on 21 December 1919 the Ukrainian Soviet government was declared for the final time.

The Ukrainians living in the territories of the former Austrian Empire were no more successful than their East Ukrainian brethren in their attempts at creating an independent Ukrainian state. With the help of an army equipped by the French, the Poles succeeded in conquering the territories of Western Ukraine by July 1919. After defeating the West Ukrainians, the Poles incorporated East Galicia and Volhynia into their newly established state. However, because the Western powers had formally committed themselves to the concept of national self-determination, a period of deliberation ensued concerning the permanent status of Eastern Galicia. To make Poland's absorption of West Ukraine appear more palatable to the Entente, the Poles signed a number of agreements guaranteeing certain rights to its national minorities.[2] The Allied Powers' handling of the Ukrainian question was a source of great disillusionment for those Ukrainians who had hoped that international arbitration and law would guarantee West Ukraine's autonomy.[3] This treatment, at the hands of the great standard-bearers of constitutionalism and legalism, Britain and America, discredited the whole concept in the eyes of many Ukrainians.

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[2] In June of 1919 Poland signed the Minorities Treaty, whereby Poland assumed the obligation to guarantee the racial, linguistic, and civil liberties of its minority groups. Later, in 1921, Poland also signed the Treaty of Riga, whose Article VII guaranteed that Ukrainians in Poland would be entitled to cultivate their culture and organize their own schools.

[3] See Mathew Stachiw and Jaroslaw Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the Turning Point of Europe's History, 1918-1923, Vol. 1 (New York, 1969), pp. 78-125; Leonid C. Sonevytsky, "The Ukrainian Question in R.H. Lord's Writings on the Paris Peace Conference", Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United State, X. 1-2 (New York, 1962-63), pp. 65-84.

Between 1919 and 1923 the Ukrainians in Galicia and the Polish administration existed in a relationship best described as "mutual negation": the Ukrainian majority in Eastern Galicia refused to recognize the Polish state as its government, boycotting the census of 1921, and the elections of 1922, while the Poles proceeded to treat Eastern Galicia as though it were an integral part of Poland, taking over control of all cultural and education institutions in the region. At this time, the more radical elements in the Ukrainian population engaged in terrorist activities against the Polish state, a portent of things to come.[4]

In 1923, after the Polish state had once again assured the Western powers that it would provide for East Galician autonomy, and insure the existence of Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions, the Council of Ambassadors, representing the victorious western allies, recognized Polish sovereignty over Eastern Galicia (referred to by the Poles as East Little Poland) and Volhynia.

Ignoring its promises to the Western Powers, the Polish state soon embarked on a policy of widespread cultural and political integration. In 1924, a year after promising to the West that they would respect Ukrainian cultural institutions, the Polish government passed a school law which transformed most of the Ukrainian schools into either bilingual or outright Polish institutions. Meanwhile, local government and the state apparatus was almost completely Polonized on West Ukrainian territory. To add insult to injury, the Land Reform Act of 1925 provided incentives to Poles to colonize Eastern Galicia and Volhynian lands; approximately 200,000 new settlers (mostly ex-servicemen of the Polish army) arrived as a result of these incentives.[5]

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[4] Alexander Motyl, "Ukrainian Nationalist Political Violence in Inter-War Poland, 1921-1939," East European Quarterly, XIX, (March, 1985), pp. 45-55.

[5] Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939," Canadian

In response to Poland's continued occupation of West Ukraine, the more radical elements in Ukrainian society engaged in terrorist attacks on Polish officials throughout the 1920s. This in turn resulted in wide scale reprisals from the Polish government in 1930 which have come to be known as the "pacification."[6]

Thus, in the 1920s and 1930s Ukraine, together with Germany and Italy, was in the ranks of the 'dissatisfied' nations of Europe. While in Italy and Germany discontent spawned radical movements intent on revolutionizing their states, in Western Ukraine a radical nationalist movement developed which had as its first and only priority the renewal of Ukrainian statehood.

Alexander Motyl, the author of an excellent 1980 study of Ukrainian nationalism, concludes that this nationalist movement was, in its essence, "simply an attempt to explain why Ukrainian statehood had been lost and how it could be regained."[7] For these reasons, much of the younger generation of war veterans and students rejected socialist and democratic approaches because they believed that they encouraged divisiveness, conflicting purposes, and poor leadership. Instead, these nationalists called for the development of a movement which could include all Ukrainians, instead of dividing them along class lines as the socialists had, and which would direct the nation's energies unconditionally and exclusively towards the attainment of independent statehood.

Slavonic Papers, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (December, 1983), p. 480.

[6] This "pacification" involved a series of punitive expeditions to the Galician countryside whereby several hundred Ukrainian villages were burned, and Ukrainian cultural institutions were destroyed. Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939," p. 487.

[7] Alexander J. Motyl, The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919-1929 (New York, 1980), p. 153.

The Democratic Path

Before examining the nationalist movement, it is first necessary to consider the other West Ukrainian political movements which existed throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and which competed with the nationalists for the loyalty of West Ukrainians. The most significant of these movements were the democratic movement, and the communist movement.

Much of the older generation of West Ukrainians, which had grown up under the peaceful conditions of Austrian rule, continued to support the doctrine of democratic-legalism, and liberal-humanism. Accordingly, they were attracted for the most part to the liberal-democratic party known as the Ukrainian National Democratic Union (Ukrains'ke Natsional'ne Demokratychne Ob"iednannia, or UNDO).[8] Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, while Ukrainian nationalists engaged in a policy of non-cooperation and terrorism against the Polish state and those who cooperated with it, the UNDO attempted to protect the interests of the Ukrainians living in Poland through legal means, such as sending its representives to the Polish parliament.

Disgusted with the terrorism of the Ukrainian nationalists, and the harsh retaliation of the Polish state, the UNDO accepted, in mid 1935, a series of agreements with the government aimed at normalizing relations between Ukrainians and the state. However, true "normalization" had little hope of succeeding, since forces opposed to any concessions to Ukrainians gained the ascendancy in the Polish government towards the end of 1935. Furthermore, chauvinistically anti-Ukrainian organizations representing the Polish population in Eastern Galicia became increasingly powerful after 1935.[9] At the same time, Polish police in Galicia acted in collusion with gangs of armed Polish paramilitary units which harassed the Ukrainian population. As it became increasingly clear that the Polish government was unlikely to abide by the terms of the "normalization," UNDO members began to question the policy of its leadership; consequently, the UNDO party began to unravel.[10] Thus, by 1936 it was clear that the UNDO's policy of "normalization" had failed, and that similar plans had little hope of succeeding in the future.

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[8] Armstrong Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 11-12. See also, Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, "Natsionalistychnyi rukh na ZUZ ta 1-yi kongres ukrains'kykh nationalistiv," (The nationalist movement in the West Ukrainian lands and the first congress of Ukrainian nationalists) in Ievhen Konavalets' ta ioho doba (Ievhen Konavalets' and his Era) (Munich: 1974), pp. 395-396.

The Communist Alternative

While the UNDO struggled to find some means of cooperating with the Polish regime, the bulk of the new generation of West Ukrainians soon rejected accommodation with the Polish regime. In the 1920s, while many were attracted to the nationalist movement, a large number was also attracted to the radical programme of the Communist movement, which was represented by the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (Komunistychna Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy, or KPZU).[11] The Communist movement in Western Ukraine benefited from the progressive cultural policies of Lenin's Bolshevik regime. In particular, Lenin's cultural policy known as "Ukrainianization," which allowed for the development of Ukrainian culture along separate lines from Russian culture, was seen as a model to be emulated. By following a program which appealed to both the Ukrainian proletariat and peasantry, the KPZU gained wide support in the 1920s, especially in Volhynia.[12] Up until the mid 1920s, Communist and left-wing parties dominated the universities of Western Ukraine. From 1927 on, however, the Communist movement in Western Ukraine began to split apart, as it came under increasing pressure from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to reject its programme of national-Communism.[13] Furthermore, in the 1930s pro-Soviet tendencies quickly diminished as Soviet collectivization, famine and purges came to be known to West Ukrainians.

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[9] Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921-1939," pp. 491-493.
[10] Ibid, p. 494.
[11] Until 1923 the KPZU was known as the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia (Komunistychna Partiia Skhidnoi Halychyny— KPSH). The major monograph dealing with the KPZU is Janusz Radziejowski, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929 (Edmonton, 1983). See also Roman Solchanyk, "The Foundation of the Communist Movement in Eastern Galicia, 1919-1921," Slavic Review 30, no. 5 (December, 1971), pp. 774-794.
[12] In the 1927 municipal elections, the KPZU's front organizations gained 516 of the 694 seats won by Ukrainians, or 74 per cent.

The growing weakness of the democratic and Communist movements in Western Ukraine played into the hands of the nationalists, whose influence over the politically active elements of Ukrainian society had been growing steadily since the early 1920s. Thus, throughout the 1930s, both the democratic and socialist paths became increasingly unrealistic; consequently, the programme of the nationalists became a viable route for Ukrainians in this region. Moreover, throughout the 1930s, a general crisis of democracy took hold of the European continent; this was especially true in Eastern Europe. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the democratic form of government was abandoned in Eastern Europe in favour of dictatorships. In Poland, the generation of the 1930s was raised in a non-democratic environment, which further aided the rise of the radical, nationalist right.

The First Nationalist Organizations

At the same time as Communist influence was gaining momentum in Western Ukraine in the early 1920s, radical nationalism was also beginning to attract wide support. The first major nationalist organization to arise was the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains'ka Viis'kova Orhanizatsiia, or UVO), which had been founded in 1920 by a small group of officers. This organization grew out of the remnants of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (Sichovi Stril'tsi, or USS), which had been the major fighting force of the

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[13] The factional struggle and split of the KPZU is examined in Radziejowski, The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, pp. 127-159.

Ukrainian People's Republic, and was led by the former leader of that military unit, Colonel Ievhen Konovalets'.[14]

Although veterans of the First World War played a major role in the founding of Ukrainian nationalist organizations, the new generation of Ukrainians was also very quick to organize itself into nationalist groups. Thus, from its very inception, the Ukrainian nationalist movement was founded upon two social groups -- students, and war veterans (particularly younger veterans).[15]

In Galicia, the first semi-nationalist groups to arise were often little more than small groups of students who possessed no clear ideological or political view, except that they agreed on the need for Ukrainian independence, and their hatred of socialism. Most of these informal groups were found in student circles, or in the Plast scouting organization.[16]

In 1924-1925 more formal nationalist student groups came into existence, one of the first of which was the awkwardly titled "Organization of the Upperclassmen of the Ukrainian Gymnasia" (Orhanizatsiia Vysokykh Klias Ukrains'kykh Hymnazii, or OVKUH). This organization of young students, which had been organized on the initiative of the UVO, distributed UVO propaganda materials, organized disruptions of Polish state celebrations at schools, and raised monies for the UVO war fund.[17] From 1924, a variety of organizations of nationalist university students had formed; by 1926 the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Soiuz Ukrains'koi Natsionalistychnoi Molodi, or SUNM) had become the umbrella organization for all of these groups; its headquarters was the Academic House (Akademichnyi Dim), the Ukrainian university student dormitory in L'viv.[18] The SUNM considered itself a support group of the UVO, and its main work involved promoting the UVO's nationalist ideology among the young.

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[14] For a history of the UVO see Zynovii Knysh, Vlasnym ruslom: Ukrains'ka viis'kova orhanizatsiia (Our Own Way: The Ukrainian Military Organization) (Toronto, 1966).

[15] Because of the political situation arising from Polish occupation of Western Ukraine, students played a disproportionately large role in Ukrainian political life in the 1920s and 1930s. This was also the situation in Romania, where students where the driving force behind the Iron Guard movement. As Eugen Weber observes, where representative institutions do not exist or function properly, schools and universities become an important platform for public discussion, and students are thus bound to serve as the vanguard of radical movements. Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," Journal of Contemporary History, I, no. 1 (1966), p. 106.

[16] Many of Plast's members had ties with the UVO; frequently, Plast would even serve as a training ground for UVO cadres. Motyl, The Turn to the Right, p. 140.

Many of the younger students who grew up in West Ukraine during the First World War were greatly affected by their childhood memories of Ukrainian independence, remembering especially the celebrations surrounding the unification of the West and East Ukrainian republics.[19] At the same time, these youths were directly affected by the Polonizing policies of the state, especially at school, where Polish teachers appeared for the first time, and as Polish became the required language of study. In short, after 1919, the students growing up in Western Ukraine were keenly aware that they were an occupied people.[20]

In 1929 the UVO and the SUNM joined together, at a conference held in Vienna, into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv

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[17] Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, "Natsionalistychnyi rukh na ZUZ ta 1-yi kongres ukrains'kykh nationalistiv," p. 400.

[18] For a brief history of SUNM and a description of its activities see Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, "Natsionalistychnyi rukh na ZUZ ta 1-yi kongres ukrains'kykh nationalistiv," pp. 401-406.

[19] Mykola Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli; spomyny (Along the march to freedom: Memoirs) Vol. I. (Toronto, 1975), p. 23.

[20] Slava Stets'ko, a Ukrainian nationalist who grew up at this time, recalls being beaten by her teacher for speaking Ukrainian in school. Such first-hand experiences with Polish oppression made it clear to children that they were under the control of another nationality. Although, recalls Stets'ko, children may not have understood nationalist ideology, they knew that Ukraine needed to fight for statehood. Interview, Peter Potichnij, (Munich: 20 August, 1989)

--OUN).[21] The fundamental principle of the OUN's ideology was the subordination of all to the goal of Ukrainian statehood. Voluntarism, irrationalism, social darwinism were all present in the ideology of the OUN, while the party was theoretically organized on the basis of the Führerprinzip.

The older generation of OUN leadership, which had grown up under the relatively more civilized conditions of the prewar era, and had been tempered by age and experience, was much more cautious than the younger generation. In contrast, the younger generation of OUN members (associated with the SUNM), which had grown up under the degrading conditions of Polish occupation, was more predisposed to a violent, daring type of resistance to Polish rule.[22] By 1940 this difference would result in a split in the OUN along generational lines. Nonetheless, throughout the 1920s and 1930s, although differing in temperament and tactics, the younger and older generations of Ukrainian nationalists shared a common ideological outlook.

Ukrainian Integral Nationalism

The extremely nationalistic movement in Ukraine following the First World War is best understood as being integral nationalism, rather than fascism, although the two movements share similar stylistic and organizational features. In particular, the OUN, like the fascists, relied heavily upon symbolism and ritual; this aspect of Ukrainian nationalism will be one of the central themes of this paper.[23] Integral nationalism first arose in Western Europe at the close of the nineteenth century. Its founder was the French ideologue Charles Maurras, the leader of the Action Française. While this ideology failed to gain wide support in Western Europe, it became a powerful force in Central and Eastern Europe following the First World War; it become one of the elements of the Fascist and Nazi ideologies in Italy and Germany. By the 1930s, integral nationalist parties were thriving in several Eastern European nations, including Hungary (the Arrow Cross), Romania (The Iron Guard), Croatia (Ustasa Party), and Slovakia (Slovak Populists).[24] Like Fascism, integral nationalism was in part a reaction against Communism; in the case of Ukraine this was particularly true since the larger part of Ukraine was under Communist domination.

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[21] For a collection of official OUN documents, including party resolutions and policy statements, see OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929-1955 r., (The OUN in the light of the resolutions of great assemblies, conferences and other documents from the struggle, 1929-1955) (n.p., 1955). The internal sources of Ukrainian radical-right nationalism's ideological and organizational formation is the major focus of Alexander Motyl's, The Turn to the Right.

[22] This generational division occurred also in the other radical nationalist movements in Eastern Europe. For example, after the death of Corneliu Codreanu, the founder of the Iron Guard movement in Romania, the older generation of Iron Guard activists "stood for temporizing and compromise," while the younger generation was reckless and "swashbuckling" in its politics. Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," p. 120. See also, John Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 40, no. 3 (September, 1968), pp. 396-410.

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[23] Stanley Payne, in his general text, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison, 1980), pp. 6ff., 195ff., provides a "descriptive typology" of fascist movements based on "(a) the fascist negations, (b) common points of ideology and goals, and (c) special common features of style and organization." The negations include anti-liberalism, anti-communism, and, to a lesser extent, anti-conservatism. The common points of ideology include an "idealist and voluntarist creed." The stylistic and organizational feature are "an aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols and political choreography" and a "tendency towards an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command." Each of these aspects of fascism outlined above are characteristics of the OUN. Yet, while fascism represented a movement seeking to revolutionize, and revitalize an already existing state, the OUN was primarily preoccupied with gaining national independence and statehood. Nonetheless, since this paper shall be examining the OUN's usage of symbolism, the similarities with fascism are more illuminating than the differences.

[24] Geoff Eley presents the following set of distinctions between fascist movements: (1) Successful indigenously generated movements (Italian fascism, nazism, Francoism); (2) small imitative movements that achieved no particular popularity in their home societies, that is, the British Union of Fascists or the various Scandinavian Nazi groups); (3) larger indigenous movements that have strong similarities of ideology, sociology, and style but that originated independently of Italian or German sponsorships that had a different configuration of social forces, and that never took power under peacetime conditions, that is, Arrow Cross in Hungary, or Iron Guard in Romania); finally, (4) the so-called Quisling regimes installed by the German's during the war." Using this definition of fascism, the OUN would probably fall under the third category of "large indigenous movements." Geoff Eley, "What Produces Fascism: Preindustrial Traditions or a Crisis of a Capitalist State," Politics & Society, 12, no. 2(1983), p. 55. Hence, if one is to utilize a broader definition of the term fascism, one may refer to movements such as the OUN or the Ustasa party as fascist. If, however, one is to follow a stricter definition of fascism, the movements in Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and Western Ukraine, would fall under the category of integral nationalism.

Maurras defined an integral nationalist as any person who "places his country above everything" and who "conceives, treats, and resolves all questions in their relation to the national interest." Maurras also defined his ideology as the "exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady increase of national power." Using Maurras' definition, it is apparent that Ukrainian nationalism, as practiced by the UVO, SUNM, and OUN movements, was integral nationalist. Other basic characteristics of integral nationalist ideology are as follows: the "national will" was to be directed through a single, charismatic leader and his party élite, and action, war and violence were glorified.[25]

Dmytro Dontsov

Throughout the nineteen-twenties and thirties Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973) was almost without rival as the ideologue of Ukrainian nationalism.[26] Dontsov enjoyed unchallenged and unquestioned popularity among Ukrainian nationalist youth in Western Ukraine, especially students.[27] Taking his writings literally and unquestioningly, Dontsov's youthful followers looked upon him as their prophet and "king".[28]

Born in 1883 in a heavily russified district in Southern Ukraine, Dontsov was raised in a household where Russian was the main language of communication, although his parents knew how to speak Ukrainian.[29] He attended university in St. Petersburg where he joined the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP). His strong animosity towards Russia, which he perceived as a grave threat to Ukraine, set him apart from his USDRP comrades; consequently, before the outbreak of the First World War, Dontsov broke with the USDRP. At this time, he came to believe that political separation from Russia was absolutely necessary for Ukraine's survival.

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[25] The basic work on the ideology of integral nationalism is Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York, 1948). See also John Armstrong "Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe," pp. 396-410.

[26] The major monograph dealing with Dontsov's political and philosophical thought is Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi's Dmytro Dontsov: politichnyi portret (English title: Dmytro Donzow: a Political Portrait) (Toronto, 1974).

[27] Motyl, The Turn to the Right, p. 84.

[28] Myroslav Prokop, "Dmytro Dontsov," Suchasnist' no. 5(149) (May 1973), p. 51.

[29] Sosnovs'kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, p. 66.

In 1921 Dontsov presented his world view in a book titled Pidstavy nashoi polityky (The foundations of our politics); in 1926 he presented a far more systematic explication of his outlook in a book simply titled Natsionalizm (Nationalism). Throughout the 1920s Dontsov edited the highly influential journals (Literaturno-naukovyi) vistnyk (Literary-Scholarly Herald) and Zahrava (Glow), which had a particularly strong effect on the West Ukrainian student movement. Both of these journals were financed by Ievhen Konavalets', and accordingly served as organs of the UVO.[30]

Dontsov's program for Ukraine's liberation was based on the premise that Russia was Ukraine's foremost enemy and that the peasantry or the "mass" of the nation, rather than the urban élite or intelligentsia had to be the backbone of the liberation movement. Perhaps noting the fate of Skoropads'kyi's regime, which relied almost exclusively upon Germany's support, Dontsov rejected a dependence on foreign alliances, arguing instead that Ukrainians had to rely on their own forces.[31] Since Ukraine had no regular army, Dontsov also advocated the legitimacy of terrorism as a weapon against Ukraine's occupiers. Finally, his program placed great emphasis on the role of youth, and rejected the moderation of the older generation of Ukrainians, which was seen as being accommodating to the Polish occupiers.[32]

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[30] See Sosnovs'kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, pp. 170-182.

[31] Motyl, Turn to the Right, pp. 62, 69.

[32] Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 22. Illustrative of Dontsov's preoccupation with the younger generation was his close association with the SUNM. The SUNM membership, in turn, idolized Dontsov and engrossed themselves in his writings. Stepan

In Dontsov's philosophy of "active nationalism" or "nationalism of the deed" (chynnyi natsionalizm), an elite group, or "initiative minority" of dedicated nationalists had to "activate the masses," and inspire them to a national uprising.[33] For Dontsov, the ideal "active nationalist" would have to be a "person of action" who, possessed of a fanatical faith in the truth of the nationalist cause, would place the interest of the nation above all else. Ironically, although Dontsov vociferously advocated "active nationalism," he himself remained, as Myroslav Prokop puts it, "in general, a man of words, not actions."[34]

After the Second World War Dontsov made it clear that in his eyes Stepan Bandera was a model "active nationalist," and a great leader of the Ukrainian nation.[35] Thus, Dontsov and Bandera existed in a state of symbiosis with one another: Dontsov, a man of ideas who preached action but was not inclined to act himself needed a Bandera. In turn, while Bandera was indeed a man of action he lacked great originality in his ideological thinking, borrowing most of his program for action from Dontsov.

To many, the violent nationalist struggle in Ukraine during the 1930s and 1940s, and the nationalist ideology characteristic of that period, is associated with the name Stepan Bandera; without a doubt, he is the most widely known Ukrainian nationalist of this

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Lenkavs'kyi, a former SUNM leader, recalls that one of the major activity of the SUNM was the publication of brochures and newspapers which commented upon and discussed Dontsov's writings. Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, "Natsionalistychnyi rukh na ZUZ ta 1-yi kongres ukrains'kykh nationalistiv," p. 402.

[33] A detailed examination of Dontsov's philosophy of "active nationalism" is presented in Sosnovs'kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, pp. 231-288.

[34] Myroslav Prokop, "Dmytro Dontsov," p. 53; Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, "Natsionalistychnyi rukh na ZUZ ta 1-yi kongres ukrains'kykh nationalistiv," p. 422. According to Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, when asked by a group of his youthful followers in 1929 to take the leadership of the organization which was to become the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Dontsov refused, saying that he preferred to focus on his ideological publications.

[35] See, for example, Dmytro Dontsov, "Im"ia -- Symvol," (Name -- Symbol) Homin Ukrainy (Echo of Ukraine), XI, no. 47(548) (14 November, 1959), p. 2.

period. In Soviet propaganda, or to those who opposed Stepan Bandera and his followers, this nationalist uprising was known as the "Banderivshchina" (Bandera Rebellion); the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists were, moreover, collectively known as the "Banderivtsi" (Banderites). Regardless of how one appraises the actions of the Ukrainian nationalists during the 1930s and 1940s, it is clear that the history of that period in Western Ukraine is inexorably bound with that of Stepan Bandera.

Bandera: Childhood and Youth

Born January 1, 1909, in the village of Uhryniv Staryi near Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivs'k), Stepan Bandera was the second oldest of six children. The oldest sibling was his sister Marta, and his younger siblings were his brother Oleksander; sister Volodymyra; brother Vasyl'; sister Oksana; and brother Bohdan. Volodymyra and Oksana are the only surviving members of the family; they live today in the rustic setting of their birth, proudly refusing gifts from the curious reporters that come to their village to ask them about their famous brother.

Bandera came from a clerical family: his father, Andrii Bandera, was a Greek-Catholic priest at the village parish, and his mother Myroslava's family had a long tradition of clerical ties. Bandera's father would also serve as a parliamentarian in the West Ukrainian People's Republic.

In his brief autobiography, written in 1959, Bandera reflected that he was raised "in an atmosphere of Ukrainian patriotism," and of political activity.[36] Bandera's sister, in a 1990 interview, recalled her childhood surroundings in a similar light: "It all started with our father," affirmed Volodymyra. With his stories of Petliura, Skoropads'kyi, and Trotsky (whom their father had apparently met once as a representative of the WUPR), Bandera's father transfixed young Stepan.[37]

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[36] Stepan Bandera, "Moi zhyttiepysni dani" (My autobiographical data) in Stepan Bandera, Perspektyvy ukrains'koi revoliutsii (Perspectives of the Ukrainian revolution) (Munich: 1978). This brief autobiography was originally published in Homin Ukrainy, No. 42(648)-45(651) (14 October-4 November, 1961).

According to Bandera himself, the celebrations surrounding the unification of the Western and Eastern Ukrainian Republics made a particularly strong impression on him as a young boy, capturing his imagination, and "crystallizing" his feelings of patriotism.[38] With the advance of the Polish army through Galicia, Andrii Bandera joined the Ukrainian Galician Army as a chaplain; after the war, he returned home to his village, only to face, two years later, the death of his wife from throat cancer. Stepan Bandera was only eleven years old at the time.

Although raised in a wartime environment, Bandera was not, at least as a child, fascinated by warfare, or the weapons of war. His sister recalls how near the village church there were stockpiles of Polish weaponry left over from the war which many of the children played with. Her brother Stepan, however, preferred to pound away on an old drum, thus earning the nickname "Stepan Baraban" (Drum).[39] Instead of being fascinated by warfare like many of his contemporaries,[40] young Bandera was enchanted by the elan and mystique of secret organizations, of revolutionaries and terrorists.[41] Appropriately enough, recalls Volodymyra, young Stepan always had the look of a "plotter" or "conspirator" himself. Surprisingly, considering Bandera's later animosity to communism,

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[37] Iurii Pankov, "Stepan Bandera," Ternopil' Vechirnyi No. 32 (21 Oct., 1990), p. 7. This article is based on a 1990 interview with Volodymyra Bandera, one of Stepan Bandera's younger sisters. Also found in Megapolis Ekspres No. 5 (31 May, 1990).

[38] Bandera, "Moi zhyttiepysni dani", p. 2.

[39] Oksana and Volodymyra Bandera, Interview, (Uhryniv Staryi, July 1991). This video was given to the author of this paper by Stepan Bandera (grandson of Bandera). The name of the person who conducted the interview is unknown.

[40] See Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, p. 23.

[41] Pankov, "Stepan Bandera," p. 7.

Lenin, the image of the ascetic revolutionary, was Bandera's childhood idol. Later, after reading some of the Russian classics, young Bandera sought to emulate the Russian nihilists.[42]

Since during the war most of the schools were closed in Western Ukraine, it was only in 1919 that young Bandera entered school for the first time. From 1919 to 1927 Bandera was a student at the Ukrainian Gymnasium in the town of Stryi (about 80 kilometers from his home village). Although at first the school was relatively free from Polish control, after 1925, according to Bandera, it came under strict control by the Polish authorities. Still, some of the Ukrainian teachers managed to surreptitiously inject patriotic themes into the compulsory lessons.

Far more important, however, for the development of nationalism in young students, were the student organizations; it was mainly through such organizations, asserts Bandera, that he was introduced to the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism.[43] Although Bandera was afflicted with severe childhood arthritis, sometimes to the point where he was unable to walk, he completely immersed himself in the activities of numerous Ukrainian student organizations, including Plast (scouting) and Sokil (Falcon -- a sporting organization). From the age of fourteen, Bandera was active in the underground student organization associated with the UVO -- the above mentioned "Organization of the Upperclassmen of the Ukrainian Gymnasia" (OVKUH). According to Petro Mirchuk, the author of a hagiographic biography of Bandera -- Stepan Bandera: symvol revoliutsiinoi bezkompromisovosty (Stepan Bandera -- symbol of revolutionary steadfastness), Bandera, together with a group of his school friends, was one of the founders of this organization.[44]

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[42] Ibid.

[43] Bandera, "Moi zhyttiepysni dani," p. 5.

[44] Petro Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera: symvol revoliutsiinoi bezkompromisovosty (Stepan Bandera: symbol of revolutionary steadfastness) (New York, 1961), p. 16.

At this time, Bandera developed a friendship which was to be important for the development of his nationalist outlook. Stepan Okhrymovych (1905-1931), a student at the gymnasium with Bandera, was also a member of Bandera's Plast scouting troupe, as well as a member of the OVKUH underground student group. From a young age Okhrymovych had a deep interest in Ukrainian nationalist ideology.[45] As a youth, he managed to acquaint himself with the major works of Ukrainian nationalism, such as Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi's Samostiina Ukraina; as Okhrymovych explicated and interpreted the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism to his friend, the two boys entered into a mentor-pupil relationship which would last until Okhrymovych's death in 1931.[46]

In 1928, Bandera entered the agricultural program at the L'viv Polytechnical Institute. One of his fellow students was his future wife, Iaroslava Oparivs'ka, a young woman from the Lemko region. At this time, he became a full-fledged member of the UVO. While working for that organization he also worked for the SUNM; according to Mirchuk, Bandera was one of the most active organizers of the SUNM movement.[47] Throughout this period Bandera maintained his friendship with Stepan Okhrymovych, who by this time was a dedicated proponent of Dontsov's world view.[48] Working as a nationalist ideologue and publisher for the SUNM, Okhrymovych became one of the leaders of that organization, and was a key student representative at the first congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Vienna (February 1929). Through his relationship with Okhrymovych and his association with the nationalist youth movement, Bandera constantly encountered the ideas and program of Dontsov, and came to fully accept them, like many of his youthful counterparts. According to Mykola Klymyshyn, who spent several years in prison with Bandera in the nineteen-thirties, Okhrymovych remained a powerful stimulus to the development of Bandera's nationalist outlook throughout the 1920s.[49]

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[45] For a brief biographical sketch of Stepan Okhrymovych, see Volodymyr Ianiv, "Zustrich z polk. Evhenom Konoval'tsem na tli nastroiv doby," (Meeting with Col. Ievhen Konovalets' against the backgound of the mood of the time) in Ievhen Konavalets' ta ioho doba, pp. 448-449.

[46] Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, pp. 15-16.

[47] Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, p. 18. Bandera is not mentioned as a significant member of the SUNM in any other sources, yet it is not unlikely, considering Bandera's association with Okhrymovych.

[48] Motyl, Turn to the Right, p. 150.

While a great many students were under Dontsov's influence, Bandera actually acted upon Dontsov's radical program: by the time he was nineteen years old Stepan Bandera was a professional revolutionary. As Bandera recalls in his autobiography, "I spent most of my energy during my student years in revolutionary national-liberation activities. These activities increasingly captivated me, pushing aside any plans, and even any thoughts of ever finishing my studies."[50]

Much to the dismay of Bandera's family, Bandera embraced nationalism with utmost zeal and, in keeping with Dontsov's teachings, as an end in itself. Volodymyra recalls that her brother frequently recited the integral nationalist credo "the nation above all!". Bandera's father was especially disturbed by his son's dogmatic stand, as is illustrated by the following anecdote. "We were all nationalists back then," recalled Volodymyra, "But Stepan...":

> Once, when he was studying at the L'viv Polytechnical Institute, he came home for the holidays. Before Christmas the whole family assembled and went to church. But some of his friends came up to him and he took off before the end of the service. Father was completely exasperated. He sent the rest of us children out of the room and then shouted at him for quite some time. I don't recall what Stepan replied, but he left home very pale and, turning exclaimed, "First the nation, and then that God!"[51]

Yet even though Bandera apparently placed the importance of the nation above all else at this stage in his life, he never actually rejected Christianity. Indeed, when he did set down his ideological program in later years, he took great pains to interweave and reconcile Ukrainian nationalism with Christianity. Moreover, he even launched angry tirades against his ideological program in later years, he took great pains to interweave and reconcile Ukrainian nationalism with Christianity. Moreover, he even launched angry tirades against those who sought to secularize the nationalist movement.[52]

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[49] Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, pp. 31-32.

[50] Bandera, "Moi zhyttiepysni dani," p. 5.

[51] Pankov "Stepan Bandera," p. 7.

By the nineteen-thirties, Bandera's childhood fascination with Lenin had been transformed into a burning hatred of what he termed "bolshevism." Dontsov's argument that Russia was the greatest threat to Ukraine was certainly familiar to Bandera. But personal experience also reinforced this outlook. In the early nineteen-thirties relatives on his father's side of the family escaped Stalin's Ukraine, and while staying with Bandera's family, recalls Volodymyra, "they could speak only of the famine, which was occurring then; of the collectivization, the arrests, the G.P.U... of the U.S.S.R. they could recall only sorrow." Volodymyra recalls that her brother summed the situation up as follows: "While we are under the Pans (Polish landlords) our lives shall be a struggle. If the Soviets come, that will be the death of us."[53]

By the end of this early period of his life, Bandera had cultivated a number of beliefs and notions which would remain with him and guide his conduct for the rest of his days: a firm belief that Ukraine had to win its independence; that Russia and Russian Communism were the greatest threats to the Ukrainian cause; a profound fascination with the mystique of revolutionary struggle; and a sense that the nationalist cause stood above all else, including Christian moral scruples. The ideological instruction he received as a youth set the stage for the next phase of his life -- that of a terrorist, propagandist, and nationalist leader. Thus, it is apparent that Bandera's outlook was very much a product of his age, of his generation, and of his nation's unfortunate predicament. What set him apart from his contemporaries was not the originality of his ideas, but rather his single-minded devotion to the cause of Ukrainian nationalism and his ability to gain acceptance as a symbol of national resistance.

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[52] Stepan Bandera, "Proty fal'shuvannia vyzvol'nykh pozytsii," (Against the distortion of the liberation position) in Stepan Bandera, Perspektyvy ukrains'koi revoliutsii, pp. 322-327.

[53] Pankov, "Stepan Bandera," p. 7.

CHAPTER II

TERRORIST AND PROPAGANDIST: THE 1930s

The 1930s was a period of rapid advancement for Bandera's career as a professional nationalist revolutionary. It was also a time of apprenticeship for him, as he honed his political skills and instincts, and learned valuable lessons which would serve him well later in his career. This period began with his work as a student activist for the UVO, and ended with his arrest and trial in 1935 as territorial leader of the outlawed OUN. Bandera's defiant stand at this trial was a central event in his life. On a political level, it enhanced his prestige in the eyes of his peers, thus guaranteeing him a place of authority within the nationalist movement. It was also a central event at another level: following Bandera's death, when he was canonized as a nationalist saint by his supporters, this episode would become a key episode in the nationalist hagiographies of his life.

As noted, Bandera officially became a member of the UVO in 1928. At first he did reconnaissance work, but he soon switched to the propaganda department. Bandera had an intuitive grasp of the principles of propaganda work, as well as of its importance for his movement. Late that same year, he gained his first lesson on the grimmer side of life as a professional revolutionary when, together with his father, he was arrested for distributing UVO propaganda brochures. Although the experience was unpleasant, it was a short one, as he was soon released by the Polish authorities.[1]

When the SUNM and the UVO united in the following year to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Bandera immediately became a member, and was even present at its founding conference in Vienna. At first Bandera conducted general organization work in the Stryi district of Stanyslaviv (Ivano-Frankivs'k) province, where he grew up, while simultaneously working in the OUN's propaganda department. By 1930 he had taken control of the OUN's underground publication network, and was thus responsible for the transportation and distribution of the OUN's illegal propaganda pamphlets, which were printed in Czechoslovakia, and then surreptitiously conveyed to Poland. Bandera's success in dealing with the daunting logistical obstacles of this task illustrate his abilities as an organizer. A year later, Bandera advanced to the position of OUN propaganda director for the entire territory of Western Ukraine, known in OUN terminology as the zakhidni Ukrains'ki zemli (Western Ukrainian lands) or ZUZ.[2] Mirchuk attributes the selection of young Bandera, as opposed to a more experienced publicist (Dmytro Dontsov had been offered the position before Bandera, but declined it), to the pressure of Bandera's friend Stepan Okhrymovych. Apparently, not only did Okhrymovych recognize Bandera's gift for propaganda, but he also preferred someone who was untainted by any previous affiliation with legalist-traditional political parties.[3] Between 1932 and 1933, Bandera also served as deputy leader of the OUN(ZUZ).

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[1] Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, p. 129.

Bandera's friend, Stepan Okhrymovych, was the leader of the OUN(ZUZ) in the early 1930s. In 1931, he was captured and severely tortured by the Polish police because of his involvement in underground activities. Shortly after his release from prison Okhrymovych died. According to Mykola Klymyshyn, Okhrymovych's death had a profound impact on Bandera, intensifying his nationalism and his dedication to the OUN's cause.[4] Okhrymovych's successor, Ivan Gabrusevych, was forced to flee abroad shortly after taking office; his successor, Bohdan Kordiuk, who had been responsible for a poorly planned terrorist attack, was ordered by Konavalets' to Prague, to account for his actions. Consequently, in January 1933, as the second in command after Kordiuk, Bandera became the acting head of the OUN(ZUZ). After Kordiuk's dismissal, Bandera officially became the head of the OUN(ZUZ) in June 1933, at the age of 24.[5] Hence, Bandera's rapid rise to power in the OUN can be attributed for the most part to the devastation of the OUN(ZUZ)'s ranks in the early 1930s.

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[2] As director of propaganda for the OUN(ZUZ), Bandera advanced three major strategies. First, he sought to organize a boycott of liquor and tobacco among Ukrainians, since revenue from their monopoly went to the Polish government. Second, Bandera organized (through the youth branches of the OUN and UVO) a series of "School Actions," or demonstrations by students against the Polish state. These demonstrations (which were called for by the OUN through pamphlets) included the desecration and destruction of emblems and symbols of the Polish state, and the refusal to speak Polish in class. Bandera's third major tactic as OUN propaganda director was the promotion of a cult of Ukrainian nationalism. Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, pp. 21-24.

[3] Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, p. 21.

At the same time, however, Bandera's natural disposition also aided his rise to power. According to Lev Rebet, who was sharply at odds with Bandera from the mid 1930s, and even more so in the 1940s and 1950s, Bandera possessed an "organizational knack, and a realistic approach to matters" which set him apart from the romanticism prevalent in the "Academic House" clique which dominated the OUN(ZUZ). This, argues Rebet, helped him secure a solid place for himself amidst this clique, even though he contributed nothing fundamentally original to the OUN.[6] It also appears that Bandera had a certain instinct for leadership, in that he was unyielding in his desire to encourage and animate his comrades; this is revealed by the recollections of a prison guard who watched over Bandera when he was imprisoned in 1932 for crossing the Czech-Polish Border:

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[4] Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, pp. 31-32.

[5] In his autobiography, Bandera stated that the direction of the OUN(zuz) under his leadership continued "principally along the lines practised hitherto, although with more emphasis on some activities, and less on others." He outlined the following five tenets of his policy as leader of the OUN(ZUZ). First, he sought to raise and greatly expand the number of cadres throughout the West Ukrainian lands. Specifically, he endeavoured to broaden the range of groups from which cadres were raised. While traditionally the OUN focused on building cadres from soldiers and students, Bandera sought to organize workers and peasants as well. Second, he devised a more systematic approach to the practical and ideological training and education of new OUN cadres. Third, he continued the "mass actions" he had devised as propaganda director, such as the anti-monopoly and school actions. Fourth, Bandera instituted a terrorist campaign, the goal of which was to "demonstrate the unity of the liberation front, the solidarity of West Ukraine with the Central and East Ukrainian lands, and to root out communist and sovietophile-agent work among the West Ukrainian population." Bandera, "Moi zhyttiepysni dani," p. 7.

[6] Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN,(The light and the shadows of the OUN) (Munich, 1964), p. 59. This work was first published in the journal Ukrains'kyi samostiinyk, no. 247(November, 1954) and no. 277 (August, 1955).

> Bandera often asked for pills for headaches, and also defaced prison property. I brought him porridge in a mess-tin, he ate it but then scratched onto his plate "Death before betrayal!" I exchanged his mess tin and then he scratched: "We shall build a Ukrainian state or die in the struggle for it!"[7]

Bandera persisted in inscribing these messages so that, as the guards distributed the mess-kits throughout the different prison cells, Bandera was able to communicate his message of continued resistance to his fellow nationalist inmates. Even one of Bandera's most bitter opponents, Zynovii Knysh, a former UVO activist and author of the highly critical book Bunt Bandery (The Bandera Rebellion), states that "there is no doubt that he was high principled, and devoted [to Ukrainian nationalism]."[8] This fanatical enthusiasm and devotion to the Ukrainian national liberation idea, helped Bandera win the respect of his revolutionary cohorts.

The Religion of Ukrainian Nationalism:

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the Fascist and Nazi movements in Italy and Germany, and the integral nationalist movements in eastern European countries such as Croatia and Slovakia, utilized pseudo-religious rituals to inculcate discipline and self-sacrifice, to promote group solidarity, and to widen the support of their movements. As Armstrong observes, such nationalist rituals, which aimed at undermining rationality and insuring blind obedience, inevitably destroyed all traditional moral scruples.[9] This point was not lost on contemporary observers. As an American witness of Fascist Italy remarks:

> It is not for nothing that fascism is so ritualistic. The marches, salutes, yells, songs, uniforms, badges and what not, are giving a new focus to the imagination of the Italian youth, are linking their social life to political organization and are filling their minds with political --- I will not say ideas,

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[7] Pankov, "Stepan Bandera," p. 7.

[8] Zynovii Knysh, Bunt Bandery (n.p., 1950); Zynovii Knysh, Interview by Yurij Darewych, (Toronto, 4 June 1989).

[9] Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War II," p. 404.

> but political --- feelings. This is perhaps the greatest of the fascist revolutions. Good Italian youths still go to mass and participate in religious festivities, but their sentiments, their imaginations, their moral ideals are centered elsewhere.[10]

In Ukraine, the nationalists similarly utilized such tactics; in particular, they were used by the SUNM movement, whose ideological patriarch, Dontsov, had profound fascist tendencies with regard to style.[11] While commemorations of war heroes and national holidays were nothing new in Ukrainian society,[12] what was new was that the nationalist rituals used by the SUNM --- like those of the fascists in Italy, and the integral nationalists throughout Eastern Europe --- supplanted traditional patriotism and Christian morality with new rituals that rejected traditional moral scruples. The OUN, which was the product of the marriage of the SUNM and the UVO, maintained and expanded these rituals.

The pseudo-Christian value system of the OUN at the time of its founding, in 1928, is illustrated by its "decalogue," a nationalist Ten Commandments to be followed by OUN members. The OUN decalogue was itself based on that of the SUNM, a fact which illustrates the ideological contribution of the student organization to the OUN.
(Where the SUNM's decalogue differs from that of the OUN it is printed parenthetically.)[13]

1) You will attain a Ukrainian State or die in battle for it.
2) Do not allow anyone to defame the glory or the honour of your nation.

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[10] Herbert W. Schneider, Making the Fascist State (New York, 1928) pp. 222-223.

[11] Motyl, Turn to the Right, p. 82. On the relationship between Dontsov's nationalism and fascism, see Sosnovs'kyi, Dmytro Dontsov, pp. 288-298.

[12] As John-Paul Himka observes, annual commemorations of the national poet Taras Shevchenko, and other such "print-culture" holidays had supplemented traditional religious and seasonal feasts by the late nineteenth century. John-Paul Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century (Edmonton, 1988), p. 194.

[13] The OUN's decalogue presented below is translated from the version found in OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, konferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929-1955.(n.p., 1955), p. 16. The SUNM's decalogue is translated in Motyl, Turn to the Right, p. 142.

3) Remember the Great Days of the Struggle.
4) Be proud of the fact that you are an heir of the Struggle for the glory of St. Volodymyr's Trident.[14]
5) Avenge the death of Great Knights.[15]
6) Do not speak of the Cause with anyone, but only with whomever necessary.
7) Do not hesitate to commit the most dangerous deeds, if the good of the Cause demands it.("Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of the Cause demands it.")
8) Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hatred and contempt.
9) Neither requests, nor threats, nor torture, nor death can compel You to betray a secret.
10) Struggle to expand the strength, riches and glory of the Ukrainian State.("Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.")

As Motyl has argued, the SUNM saw its nationalism as an all-encompassing system, such as a religion, which had the capacity to create its own traditions, rituals and mythology.[16] The centrepiece of the SUNM's mythology was the "cult of heroes" (kul't heroiv). Soldiers and UVO members who had died for the cause were idealized, and their graves were made the objects of veneration. Furthermore, as the third commandment of the decalogue observes, the SUNM members were admonished to celebrate various nationalist holy days, such as the battle of Kruty, in which several hundred Ukrainians died in battle against the Bolsheviks. The OUN not only adopted the SUNM's "ten commandments," but it also embraced the SUNM's cult of heroes. When Bandera became the propaganda director of the OUN(ZUZ), he made use of such pseudo-Christian rituals and symbols; in so doing, he was building upon the established practices of the nationalist movement.

Bandera as High Priest:

As the son of a Byzantine Catholic (Uniate) priest, Bandera was raised in an environment where ritual and symbolism were central components of religious faith. He was also raised in an atmosphere where nationalism and Christianity were intertwined: Bandera's father was not only a priest, but was also an ardent nationalist (albeit of an older, more moderate generation). Later in his life, as a member of the SUNM, Bandera was exposed to nationalist rituals. Accordingly, when he became the virtual "high priest" of the OUN in his capacity as propaganda director, he appreciated the importance of symbols in the minds of the masses, and their ability to promote nationalist feelings and group unity. In particular, Bandera recognized that nationalist heroes and martyrs could be fashioned into powerful symbols.[17]

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[14] Volodymyr [Vladimir] was the first Christian Grand Prince of Kievan Rus'; he baptised the East Slavs in 988 A.D.

[15] The death of "Great Knights" refers to the death of great heroes of the nationalist struggle.

[16] Motyl, The Turn to the Right, p. 143.

Before Bandera became propaganda director of the OUN(ZUZ), the veneration of nationalist heroes took place at the burial mounds (mohyly)[18] of the fallen (usually, these were graves of soldiers of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen unit [Ukrain'ski Sichovi Stril'tsi, or USS]). Since, however, not every town had graves of national heroes, Bandera expanded the scope of this ritual by organizing the veneration of symbolic burial mounds, or monuments to the unknown soldier. These symbolic burial mounds were set up throughout the cities and towns of Western Ukraine. During ceremonies celebrating the "Great Days of the Struggle," the monuments would be blessed by priests. Consequently, if the monuments were later desecrated or removed by the Polish authorities (which frequently happened), the religious indignation of the Ukrainian population would be aroused.[19]

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[17] As Kenneth C. Farmer observes, there are a number of elemental symbols of national identity which are common to ethnic groups. One of these symbols is the memory of famous men. Such symbols lend the group a sense of pride in their own genius and perpetuate their national identity. Such symbols may also be used to promote or advance a particular type of national awareness. In his work, Farmer demonstrates how the Soviet regime in the 1960s and 1970s used symbols to promote Soviet patriotism. Kenneth Farmer, Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era (The Hague, 1980), p. 163.

[18] In Ukraine, a mound of earth is traditionally built upon grave sites; the grave site, together with this burial mound is collectively known as a "mohyla."

[19] Iaroslav Svatko, "Doba i dolia," (Epoch and fate) Vyzvol'nyi Shliakh, XLIV-XLV, nos. 8(521)-3(528) (August, 1991-March, 1992), pp. 914-915. This work, which was originally to be entitled "Doba i dolia Stepana Bandery" (The epoch and fate of Stepan Bandera) represents the most elaborate attempt at rehabilitating Stepan Bandera in the form

The Legend of Bilas and Danylyshyn

While Bandera was head of the OUN's propaganda bureau, two new nationalist "saints" were canonized by the OUN. In an unsuccessful raid on a Polish post office in the town of Horodok in November 1932, two OUN activists were killed, while four others, Vasyl' Bilas, Dmytro Danylyshyn, Mariian Zhurakivs'kyi and Zenon Kossak, were arrested and put on trial. The ensuing trial, which resulted in the execution of Bilas and Danylyshyn, was made known to the Ukrainian public in a variety of newspapers, such as the legal publication Dilo, and served to dramatically publicize the activities of the OUN.[20]

Bilas and Danylyshyn acquitted themselves well during the trial proceedings.[21] By steadfastly maintaining that their actions were justified and noble, the defendants served as effective propaganda for the OUN and its revolutionary conception of nationalism. In his closing statement, Danylyshyn stated that his only regret was "that I can no longer work for our dear Ukraine." Bilas concluded thus:

> I am aware of my guilt and my punishment. I am a nationalist and a revolutionary. In my life I have committed but one crime, and that was during interrogation, when, shirking my own duty, I implicated my comrade Kossak in crimes...[22]

Alongside the accounts of this trial presented by the legal Ukrainian language press, the propaganda apparatus of the OUN, under Bandera's command, distributed thousands of propaganda leaflets throughout the Ukrainian countryside, so that when Bilas and Danylyshyn were executed, church bells rang throughout Western Ukraine to honour them.

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of a biography. It was first published in 1991 in the L'viv newspaper Ratusha. The attempts to rehabilitate Bandera are discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis.

[20] Iurii Starosol's'kyi, "U bezkonechnii cherzi: Pryzabuti storinky istorii L'vova," Suchasnist' 1983(9), pp. 76-87.

[21] An edited transcript of the trial of Bilas and Danylyshyn is found in Danylo Chaikovs'kyi's Bilas i Danylyshyn (Bilas and Danylyshyn) (New York, 1969), pp. 67-179. This book also includes a number of essays dealing with Bilas and Danylyshyn; it represents the official OUN account of their 'martyrdom.'

[22] Chaikovs'kyi, Bilas i Danylyshyn, p. 189.

Thus, traditional Ukrainian methods of honouring heroes were harnessed by the OUN's propaganda apparatus to glorify nationalist heroes who represented a new morality, a morality which placed the good of the nation above all, including Christianity and its principles.[23]

The irony of the OUN's predilection for combining terrorism with Christian symbolism is illustrated by the following anecdote related to the "martyrdom" of Bilas and Danylyshyn. At a symbolic burial mound constructed at the site where they had been arrested, a note was attached to the cross atop the mound warning the Polish police not to remove the cross. Ignoring the warning, the police attempted to remove the cross, which had been trip-wired to a bomb. One of the policemen was killed by the explosion.[24]

The trial and execution of Bilas and Danylyshyn, and the political and propaganda gains resulting from their trial and martyrdom, were an important lesson for Bandera. In 1936, finding himself in similar circumstances, Bandera would follow their example, and set himself before the Ukrainian people as a martyr and saint for the nationalist cause.

Propaganda and the Masses

Underlying all Bandera's propaganda activities, and later his programme as leader of the OUN(ZUZ), was a premise adhered to by Dontsov, that only through a nationalist uprising by the masses could Ukraine gain its independence. Similarly, Bandera always maintained that only by spreading nationalist ideas to the Ukrainian masses and inciting a popular uprising could independence be achieved. In his essay "The Foundations of our Liberation Policy" ("Do zasad nashoi vyzvol'noi polityky"), Bandera clearly presents his view of how the nationalist revolution would unfold. In the first phase the OUN would struggle to win the "souls of the popular mass." Once the OUN's "ideas and programme dominate the widest masses of the Ukrainian population," then the second phase of the revolution, that of military struggle against Ukraine's occupants, begins. The third phase of the nationalist revolution is that of building the Ukrainian state.[25] Since Ukraine's liberation could only occur through the "activation" of the masses by propaganda, propaganda and politics were inexorably connected in Bandera's mind, with propaganda being pre-eminent.

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[23] See "Dzvony nad L'vovom" (Bells over L'viv) Ratusha no. 34 (22 December, 1990); Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, "Koly dzvonyly dzvony nad Horodkom," in Chaikovs'kyi, Bilas i Danylyshyn, pp. 233-246.

[24] Svatko, "Doba i dolia," p. 915. Lev Rebet, a future head of the OUN(ZUZ) recalls several such incidents. Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, p. 73.

Bandera and Hitler

In a number of significant areas, Bandera's outlook and approach to propaganda and politics paralleled that of a more famous European nationalist, Adolf Hitler. For this reason, a comparison is instructive. For Hitler in Munich in the early 1920s, political activity was, in most respects, synonymous with propaganda.[26] To the question "To whom does propaganda have to appeal?", Hitler answered emphatically that it "must always address itself to the broad masses of the people."[27] The masses were indispensable for his aims; through the effective use of propaganda, presented as simply as possible in black and white terms, and appealing to emotion rather than reason, the masses could be won over. But, such propaganda could not stand on its own; it needed to be reinforced by a healthy dose of terror.[28] As Alan Bullock, the author of a 1952 biography on Hitler observes, Hitler hit upon the psychological fact that "violence and terror have their own propaganda value, and that the display of physical force attracts as many as it repels."[29]

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[25] Stepan Bandera, "Do zasad nashoi vyzvol'noi polityky," (Towards a basis for our liberation policy)(1946) in Perspektyvy, pp. 51-53.

[26] Z.A.B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (London, 1964), p. 4.

[27] Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, as quoted in Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 6.

[28] Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 6.

[29] Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (London, 1952), p. 72.

As noted, Bandera also addressed his propaganda and political work to the masses, arguing that "the broad masses must be the object of our political work."[30] Recognizing their limits, Bandera held that the "... tactics of political work among the broad masses must be uncomplicated and in every instance adapted to the political level of a given group," even if this meant adapting propaganda work to account for their flaws and weaknesses.[31] The rituals of the nationalist pseudo-religion, and its reverence for its fallen heroes, was one such uncomplicated propaganda technique.

Bandera, like Hitler, also knew that terror was an effective complement to a propaganda campaign. While in the 1930s Hitler used terror to aid his rise to power and solidify his personal position, Bandera used it to advance the nationalist revolution. As the "Bulletin of the Executive of the OUN on the West Ukrainian Lands" (Biuleten' KE OUN na ZUZ) observed: "Acts of terror against the most prominent representatives of the occupying power are an example of actions whose immediate effect and the political-propagandistic capital they bring are of equal importance." This is because the "consistent terrorization of the enemy, and the directing of the masses' attention to the immediate struggle create conditions which hasten the moment of final liberation."[32] For this reason, when Bandera became leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine in 1933, terrorism remained an integral part of his programme.

It may be that the terror tactics used by Hitler during his rise to power inspired

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[30] Stepan Bandera, "Znachennia shyrokykh mas ta ikh okhoplennia," (The meaning of the broad masses and their winning over) (Prague, 1946) also demonstrates his belief that the winning of the masses was necessary for the nationalist revolution. in Perspektyvy, p. 14.
[31] Bandera, "Znachennia shyrokykh mas...," pp. 14-15.
[32] Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, pp. 29-30. According to Ievhen Vrets'ona, a UVO member who was active in the 1930s, "the OUN, in [Bandera's] mind, had to have terror as an integral part of its programme/activities, without which no revolutionary organization can function." Ievhen Vrets'ona "Moi zustrichi z polkovnykom" (My meetings with the Colonel) in Ievhen Konovalets', p. 476.

Bandera. Yet, Donstov's interpretation of Nazi and Fascist tactics provided a constant filter through which these tactics came to Bandera's knowledge.[33] Furthermore, in the late 1920s, other UVO activists, partly under the influence of Dontsov (and perhaps even Trotsky), developed their own theory of "permanent revolution," which relied on terrorism. According to this theory, "individual assassinations and occasional mass actions ... nurture a permanent spirit of protest against the occupier and maintain hatred of the enemy and the desire for final retribution."[34] Thus, for the most part, Bandera's tactical and theoretical principles may be traced to the influence of Dontsov (and, to a lesser extent, that of UVO theoreticians), who, in turn, was influenced by a variety of ideologues, only one of which was Hitler.

Terrorist Attacks

Representatives of the Polish state apparatus, and of the Soviet state were targeted for attack by the OUN(ZUZ) under Bandera, as were Ukrainians who were perceived to be "sovietophiles" or collaborators with the Polish state's policies of assimilation or pacification.[35] In the majority of cases, Bandera acted independently of the OUN's emigre leadership. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, a member of the latter, proposed to Konavalets' that the leadership make a public declaration that "The OUN does not make use of terror in its politics and its tactics." Konavalets', although disapproving of Bandera's insubordination, chose to accept the terrorist acts as an accomplished fact; one of the attacks was, however, ordered by Konavalets'.[36] One of the most widely publicized of these attacks was the 1933 assassination of Aleksei Mailov, an attaché at the Soviet consulate in L'viv. This attack was ordered by Konovalets' as a means of bringing the artificial famine, then occurring in Soviet Ukraine, to the attention of the West.[37]Bandera took the organization of the attack upon himself, and found a suitable volunteer for the task in the person of Mykola Lemyk. Bandera arranged a meeting with the young nationalist.[38] He told Lemyk that, since no one was defending the Ukrainian peasants, and protests with words had no effect, it was necessary to protest with actions. Bandera handed Lemyk a pistol, and, then gave him some money to buy new shoes and clothing for his upcoming trial.[39]

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[33] Dontsov was impressed by Mussolini's rise to power, and commented favourably on his tactics. Dontsov observed that he was less interested in the internal politics of the Fascists, and more interested in the "methods of taking possession of the state apparatus and their consolidation (such work stands before us!) and in this sense both fascism and bolshevism set for us an example of how to do this." Dontsov, in Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi, Dmytro Dontsov: politichnyi portret, pp. 294-295. Moreover, Hitler's rise to power was carefully and uncritically followed in Dontsov's journals. Frequently Dontsov echoed the fascists or Hitler, as with Dontsov's theory of propaganda: "only clear, simple, and unconfused slogans, coupled with an unshakable faith in their sanctity, and with an unbending will to realize them attract the masses to themselves." Motyl, Turn to the Right, p. 70.

[34] "Permanentna revoliutsiia," Surma, 37, no. 10 (October 1930), p. 7. in Motyl, "Ukrainian Political Violence," p. 53.

[35] The best source on the terrorist activities of the OUN in the 1920s and 1930s is Alexander J. Motyl, "Ukrainian-Nationalist Violence In Inter-War Poland, 1921-1939," East European Quarterly, XIX, no. 1 (March, 1985), pp. 45-55. According to Motyl, at least sixty-three actual and attempted killings are known to have occurred between 1921 and 1939, only eleven of which can be considered significant as assassinations or attempted assassinations of prominent political figures. Of these eleven attacks, the following five took place during Bandera's tenure as leader of the OUN(ZUZ): Poles --- L'viv school superintendent Godomski (1933, unsuccessful); Minister of the Interior

On 22 October 1933 Lemyk entered the Soviet consulate in L'viv, selected his victim and shot him to death. As ordered by Bandera, Lemyk immediately turned himself in to the authorities. During the ensuing trial Lemyk and his lawyers constantly endeavoured to bring the question of the Ukrainian famine into the public eye. Thus, as far as Bandera was concerned, the attack was a complete success. Lemyk was sentenced to death, but on account of his youth, the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Lemyk's trial, like that of Bilas and Danylyshyn, confirmed Bandera's view that the trials of nationalist martyrs served as effective propaganda for the OUN.

Bronislaw Pieracki (1933, successful); Ukrainians --- Sydir Tverdokhlib, a writer (1933, successful); Ivan Babii (1934, successful); Russians --- Aleksei Mailov (1933, successful).

[36] Motyl, "Ukrainian National-Political Violence," p. 51.

[37] Svatko, "Doba i dolia," p. 1045.

[38] Lemyk's meeting with Bandera was recounted to Volodymyr Makar when Makar and Lemyk were together in prison; it is described by Makar in his memoirs. Volodymyr Makar, Boiovi druzi: spomyny (Comrades in arms: Memoirs) v.1 (Toronto, 1980), pp. 335-336.

[39] Svatko, "Doba i Dolia," p. 1046.

The most spectacular assassination carried out under Bandera's leadership was that of the Polish Minister of the Interior, Bronis_aw Pieracki.[40] The task of organizing the attack was left to Mykola Lebed', an undersized man, not unlike Bandera, whose nationalist ardour compenstated for his lack of physical size. Although Lebed' had no formal military training he possessed an instinct for logistics, and was thus well suited for the task. Iaroslav Karpynets', a chemistry student at Jagellionian University in Cracow, and a school-mate of Mykola Klymyshyn's, was entrusted with making a bomb for the attack. Bandera selected one Hryhorii (Hryts') Matseiko for the task of carrying out the deed. On 15 June 1934, Matseiko lingered in front of a club frequented by Pieracki until the Polish minister appeared. Matseiko immediately tossed a packet containing the bomb at the Polish Minister, but when it failed to explode, Matseiko pulled out his revolver and shot Pieracki to death.

While Matseiko made a successful escape, things began to turn sour for the OUN, as the Polish regime reacted with seemingly inexplicable swiftness in arresting suspects. Actually, a general clampdown on the OUN began the day before the assassination of Pieracki, when Klymyshyn, and Karpynets' were both arrested in Cracow. At first they were not held in connection with the attack on Pieracki, but it soon became apparent that the unexploded bomb found at the murder scene came from Karpynets' bomb laboratory. Within a week of the attack, Lebed', who had escaped to Germany, was detained by German authorities and sent back to Poland. At this time, Bandera was arrested in L'viv.

After his arrest, Bandera was imprisoned in L'viv; later he was moved to Cracow, and then to Warsaw's Mokotówo prison, where Klymyshyn and Karpynets' were being held. There they remained, each in isolation from one another, while the case against them was prepared by the Polish government. Throughout the entire year that Bandera stayed in this prison he was kept in chains.[41]

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[40] Pieracki was perceived as the perpetrator of the Polish state's policy of pacification.

Bandera's conviction was assured by the Polish state's possession of the "Senyk archive." In the words of Klymyshyn, "There were such complete details concerning Bandera, that there was not the slightest need to add anything to have a complete picture of his underground activities."[42] This account included a listing of the positions Bandera held within the OUN hierarchy, and a list of all of his pseudonyms. The "archive" similarly detailed the activities of the other defendants.[43] It is little wonder that Bandera and others later demanded Senyk's removal from the leadership of the OUN.

The Warsaw or 'Bandera Trial'

The trial of Bandera and his comrades, which has come to be known in nationalist writings as the "Warsaw Trial," or "Bandera Trial," began on 18 November 1935, and lasted for almost three months. On the day the trial commenced, the roads from the prison to the court house along which Bandera and the other defendants travelled were lined with police to prevent an escape attempt. In the first row of the defendants sat Bandera, with Lebed' to the left of him; behind them sat Klymyshyn and others. There were twelve defendants in all.

After a brief opening statement, the head of the court asked Bandera to state his name and date and place of birth. Bandera stood and gave the requested information in

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[41] Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, p. 140.

[42] Ibid., p. 124.

[43] Klymyshyn provides a detailed account of the contents of the "archive." Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, pp. 123-126, pp. 129-136. Klymyshyn recalls being startled by Senyk's persistence in acquiring his real name and address, since it was accepted as normal conspiratorial procedure to keep such information confidential at all costs. Ibid., p. 116. When one considers that the OUN was a secret organization engaged in terrorist attacks, it is hard to imagine why Senyk would have compiled such information; it was almost treacherously irresponsible of him to let it fall into the hands of the police.

Ukrainian. The head of the court reminded Bandera that he was legally bound to speak in Polish. To this Bandera replied that he intended to speak only in Ukrainian. Most of the other defendants followed Bandera's lead, and refused to answer the court's questions in Polish. Throughout the rest of the trial Bandera continually disrupted the proceedings, shouting remarks aloud to the courtroom and to his comrades; he was forcibly removed from the courtroom on several occasions and, according to Mirchuk, was even secretly beaten by the Polish police. The spectacle of resistance to the Polish state no doubt had some propaganda effect, but his greatest propaganda coup was yet to come.

At the end of the Warsaw proceedings, Bandera was sentenced to death, but at the last minute his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. Evidently, the Polish regime recognized that it would be counterproductive to create another martyr for the OUN. With the massive amount of evidence concerning the OUN's activities contained in the "Senyk archive," the Poles proceeded with a further trial of the OUN. This trial, which commenced on 25 May 1936, took place in L'viv; accordingly, the defendants were permitted to testify in Ukrainian at the trial. Bandera took full advantage of the trial's propaganda potential, and expounded at great length about the OUN, its programme, its tactics, and its aims. Like the trial of Bilas and Danylyshyn, the trial of Bandera at L'viv was followed by the Ukrainian community, and covered extensively by the Ukrainian press.

In a remarkably blunt and callous manner, Bandera explained to the courthouse his justification for the assassination of Polish officials, of Ukrainian sovietophiles, and of all the other victims of his attacks. Bandera thus justified the planned assassination of the director of a sovietophile newspaper, Novyi Shliakh (New Pathway):

> I gave the order to kill professor Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi. The attack on him was a part of the anti-bolshevik activities of the OUN. Krushel'nyts'kyi was for us a representative of sovietophilism ...

Bandera cancelled this planned attack when it became apparent that Krushel'nyts'kyi was planning a visit to the Soviet Union: Bandera surmised that the Soviets would probably kill him themselves, and that this would serve as better anti-Soviet propaganda. As it turned out, Bandera was correct: the Soviets murdered Krushel'nyts'kyi.[44]

"As for Commissar Kosobudzki," proceeded Bandera, on the subject of a successful attack on a Polish prison official,

> I received letters from my comrades who were in prison. The letters revealed that Commissar Kosobudzki employed special methods towards Ukrainian political prisoners, employed chicanery and repressions, and that the prisoners were planning to organize a hunger-strike as a protest. I gave the order to collect detailed materials and, having in my hands proof that Commissar Kosobudzki not only organized, but personally engaged in these repressions, I rejected the idea of a hunger strike and prohibited it ... I felt that the organization had a duty to defend these comrades, and for this reason I gave the order to carry out an attack on Commissar Kosobudzki. There was no trial for Kosobudzki. As I have said, the organization only tries Ukrainians.[45]

The attack upon a well respected principal of a Ukrainian gymnasium in L'viv, Ivan Babii, which occurred a few weeks after the assassination of Pieracki, was ordered, continued Bandera, only after a OUN trial had been conducted. Bandera claimed that this trial, over which he presided, determined that Babii, as well as another Ukrainian, Bachyns'kyi, were guilty of treason for having collaborated with the Polish regime:

> We believe that it is every Ukrainian's duty to subordinate his personal affairs and his whole life to the interests and good of the nation. When someone voluntarily and consciously cooperates with the enemy in fighting the Ukrainian liberation movement --- and with physical means at that, we believe that such a crime of national treason required the death sentence.[46]

These remarks, which echo the decalogue, illustrate how deeply Bandera had assimilated the value system of integral nationalism. The "interests and good of the nation," were the supreme value; everything was permissible in the name of the cause. In short, integral nationalist values were pre-eminent, while the values of Christianity, were put aside. The attack on Babii prompted Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, head of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, to denounce the OUN as "madmen," and "criminals."[47]

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[44] "Ostanni slova pidsudnykh v protsesi O.U.N.,"(Final statement of the defendants at the O.U.N. trial) Svoboda, XLIV, no. 162 (14 July, 1936), p. 3. (Reprinted from the L'viv newspaper Dilo.)

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

Throughout the trial in L'viv, OUN supporters demonstrated in front of the court-building, and even chanted nationalist slogans such as "Slava Ukraini!" (Glory to Ukraine) whenever Bandera entered the courtroom. But nothing compared in propaganda value to the testimonies and closing statement of Bandera. Having orchestrated the canonization of Bilas and Danylyshyn, and of Lemyk, Bandera knew full well the political capital that could be gained from a bold and determined stand, and from the creation of a new martyr for the cause. He also knew that he faced a life of imprisonment, and that he had but one last chance to make a contribution to the cause for which he had given up his freedom. Thus, Bandera gave the nationalist faithful one final, parting gift --- a new martyr and symbol: himself.

> The prosecutor has said that before him is seated a group of Ukrainian terrorists and its leadership. I would like to say that **we members of the OUN are not terrorists**. The OUN is involved in all aspects of national life ... military activities are not, neither according to our programme, nor according to the number of members in each individual branch of our organization, our only activity, nor even our primary one, but rather are on an equal footing with other activities (...)
>
> Because in this case an attack carried out by the organization is under consideration, one might think that the organization does not value human life in general, or even that of its members. I will tell you briefly: people, who are constantly aware in their work that at any instant they might lose their lives, such people know as no others do how to value life. They know its value. The OUN values the lives of its members, values them dearly, but our ideal, in our understanding, is so great that when when we speak of its realization, then we would be willing to sacrifice not one, nor even hundreds, but perhaps millions of people to it. You are most aware that I knew that I would lose my life, and that they gave me the chance to save my

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[47] Bohdan Budorowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem," p. 490.

> life. Living for a year with the certainty of death before me, I know how a human suffers when he has before him nothing but the prospect of losing his life. But throughout that entire time I never suffered so much as I suffered when I sent two [OUN] members to certain death: Lemyk, and the other who killed Pieracki...[48]

The impression made by Bandera on Ukrainian society in L'viv is illustrated by the following comments from a contemporary Ukrainian newspaper:

> At five in the afternoon two guards escort Stepan Bandera into the hall. He is short, of small build, skinny, with the face of a small boy, dark-haired, decently dressed in a black suit. He behaves freely, and begins to testify in a steady voice. His thoughts appear in a light form; from them it is evident that he is an intelligent person. His testimonies create a perceptible effect. The entire hall follows the testimony of Bandera with interest. One senses that this person is altogether unlike the majority of the other defendants. To questions Bandera replies that he has no feeling of guilt. "My revolutionary activities were, I felt, only the fulfillment of my duties."[49]

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the trials of Ukrainian nationalists were anxiously and avidly followed by the West Ukrainians in a number of newspapers; the daily Ukrainian language newspaper Dilo from L'viv reported on all these trials in a series of articles under the heading "In the Endless Procession" (U bezkonechnii cherzi). This newspaper coverage, as well as OUN propaganda campaigns connected with the trials and executions of Ukrainian nationalists had the effect of further crystallizing nationalist feelings in West Ukraine, particularly in its capital, L'viv, and of fanning and intensifying anti-Polish feelings.[50] As Ivan Kedryn, an important publisher during this period, argues, the trials of Ukrainian nationalists were "the most striking events or rather phenomena of the 20s or 30s in Western Ukraine."[51]

At around two in the morning after the final day of the trial, the court announced the sentences. For Bandera this was his second sentence of life imprisonment. Afterward, when it came time for the prisoners to part with their families, Bandera's father came to his son and piously made the sign of the cross over him.[52]

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[48] "Ostanni slova pidsudnykh v protsesi O.U.N.," p. 3

[49] Bat'kivshchyna (n.p., n.d) in Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, p. 149.

[50] Iurii Starosol's'kyi, "U bezkonechnii cherzi: Pryzabuti storinky istorii L'vova," (In an endless row: Forgotten pages from the history of L'viv) Suchasnist' 1983(9): pp. 76-87.

[51] Ivan Kedryn, Zhyttia -- podii -- liudy (Life -- events --people), p. 218. As quoted in Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem,", p. 490.

Bandera thus achieved one of the greatest political and propaganda successes of his career. He not only achieved a short term success by informing Western Ukraine about his movement, but he created an enduring symbol for the nationalist movement, and a new chapter in the annals of nationalist mythology --- the martyrdom of Stepan Bandera, and his heroic stand at the Warsaw Trial. Bandera probably never suspected that in a few years he would be a free man again. Instead of signifying his end, his performance throughout the Warsaw Trial would provide him with revolutionary prestige that would serve to solidify his position as a nationalist leader throughout the 1940s and beyond; in particular, when the OUN divided into two separate parties in 1940, this prestige would lead him to be selected as the leader of the more extremist group.

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[52] Oksana Romanyshyn, "V pam"iat' providnyka OUN," Homin Ukrainy, XXXVI, no. 45(2148) (November, 1984), p. 9.

CHAPTER III

CRUCIBLES: 1939-1959

The Leadership of the OUN After the Death of Konovalets'

On 23 May 1938 Ievhen Konovalets' was assassinated in Rotterdam by a Soviet agent. It was in part due to Konovalets' personal authority as founder of the OUN, and his ability to accommodate the violent temperament of the younger krai (Ukrainian ethnographical territory in Poland) group, that the OUN was able to remain united throughout the 1930s.[1] After Konovalets' death, Andrii Mel'nyk, a former colonel in the Sich Riflemen regiment, took over the leadership of the OUN. While the ideal leader for the younger generation would have been a bold, fearless revolutionary, the older generation still had greater respect for aristocratic qualities of leadership. Mel'nyk, who possessed the qualities of a Viennese or English gentleman was, accordingly, well regarded by the older generation; his brother officers in the Austro-Hungarian army even referred to him as "Lord Mel'nyk," because of his noble bearing. Yet, he did not correspond to the younger generation's ideal of a leader. Moreover, they resented him for his condescending attitude towards them, and for his moderate approach to the national-liberation struggle.[2]

After having had a year to consolidate his leadership of the party, Mel'nyk was confronted in 1939 with a situation which strained the increasingly tenuous relationship between the emigre leadership of the OUN, and the krai group. In accordance with the Munich agreements reached in October of 1938, Czechoslovakia was gravely weakened; at this time, the province of Carpatho-Ukraine (or Carpatho-Rus') began to agitate in favour of autonomy.[3] When Germany occupied Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939, it allowed the Hungarians to annex Carpatho-Ukraine, much to the disappointment of Ukrainian nationalists who had seen Germany as a possible champion and saviour of the national cause. Refusing to comply passively with Germany's arrangements, the nationalists in Carpatho-Ukraine declared independence on 15 March 1939. The krai leadership saw the Carpatho-Ukrainian state as an embryonic Ukrainian state, which could serve as a base for future nationalist operations; consequently it chose to send some of its best military personnel to the region, including Zenon Kossak, and Roman Shukhevych. Recognizing the hopelessness of the military situation, and not wanting to clash with the Germans, Mel'nyk gave orders forbidding this krai support for the Carpatho-Ukrainian state. In a short time the question of supporting Carpatho-Ukraine became irrelevant, since the tiny state was promptly liquidated by the Hungarian army. But, according to Mykola Klymyshyn, a future member of the group which split with Mel'nyk, the discord between the leadership and the krai over Carpatho-Ukraine, sowed the seeds of discord between the krai and the emigre leadership.[4]

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[1] For a survey of Western Ukraine and the OUN between 1938 and 1941, see Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 17-50.

[2] John Armstrong has also argued that Mel'nyk's friendly attitude towards the Ukrainian Catholic Church, and his clerical ties (such as the fact that he worked as director of forests on Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's estates) galled the anti-clerial younger generation, Ukrainian Nationalism, p.28. Armstrong has been criticized by Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian historians alike for this assertion (for example, Hans J. Beyer in Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXXVI (October, 1958), pp. 422-24). While Armstrong may be correct that the younger generation was anticlerical at the time of the split in the OUN in 1940, this was definitely not true in the post-war period, at least as far as the group surrounding Bandera was concerned.

For most of the Ukrainian nationalists, even after the disappointment of Carpatho-Ukraine, the prospect of a German-Soviet conflict seemed to offer the greatest possibility for Ukrainian statehood. The conventional wisdom of the day, in Ukrainian circles, was that Nazi Germany, like Imperial Germany during the First World War, would seek to establish a strong Ukrainian state as a counter to Soviet Russia. Consequently, it was a further source of frustration for the nationalists when the Ukrainian territory in Poland (with the exception of the mountainous Lemkian region) was occupied by the Soviet Union in late 1939, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

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[3] See Paul Robert Magocsi, Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948 (Cambridge, MA., 1978) pp. 234-255. See also, Peter G. Stercho, Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine, 1919-1939 (New York, 1971); Walter K. Hanak, The Subcarpathian-Ruthenian Question, 1918-1945 (Munhall, PA., 1962).

[4] Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, p. 29; Also, Klymyshyn, Interview with Slava Kushnir (Warren, Michigan, 20 July 1989).

Bandera's Escape from Prison

In the late 1930s, some of Bandera's comrades from the OUN(ZUZ) had arranged an escape plan, which was to win Bandera's release through a bribe to a corrupt prison guard. According to Lev Rebet, the emigre leadership, or provid (also known as PUN -- Provid Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv -Leadership of the Ukrainian Nationalists), did not support the plan, suspecting that it was a Polish plot. Furthermore, adds Rebet, Mel'nyk did not relish the prospect of Bandera's release, for it would have brought further pressure from the krai group upon the provid.[5] For whatever reasons, the necessary money for the escape plot did not materialize, and Bandera remained in prison until new circumstances --- the German invasion of Poland in 1939 --- permitted his escape. Amidst the chaos of the German invasion, Ukrainian nationalists were able to free Bandera on 13 September.[6]

After his release, Bandera took some time to enjoy his life, to make up for the years of confinement he had endured. It was at this time that he was married to Iaroslava Oparivs'ka. Like Bandera, she was the child of a priest. Her father had been shot by the Poles twenty years earlier. The wedding itself was a small, intimate affair, with no more than ten guests, among whom were Mykola Klymyshyn and Mykola Lemyk, the young assassin whom Bandera had spoken of in the final moments of his trial.[7]

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[5] Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, pp. 77-78.

[6] For a discussion of the differing versions of Bandera's escape, see Svatko, "Doba i Dolia," pp. 1312-1313. The traditional Soviet version of Bandera's release claims that Bandera was freed by German forces. As Svatko argues, this interpretation is unconvincing, and based on a highly suspect interrogation of a German official, which appears to have been staged as anti-nationalist propaganda. The same testimony also makes the entirely unsupportable claim that both Bandera and Mel'nyk were secret agents of the German government. See V.S. Koval', "Shcho take OUN i khto taki banderivtsi?" (What is the OUN and who are the Banderivtsi?) in Zakhidna Ukraina: pershe desiatyrichchia pislia viiny (Western Ukraine: the first decade after the war) (Kiev, 1988), p. 14.

The Split in the OUN

Western scholars, such as John Armstrong, as well as many of the participants in the events, such as Lev Rebet and Mykola Klymyshyn, agree that the differences in temperament between the younger krai group and the provid were the root of the 1940 split within the OUN. To this it is frequently added that the krai group, which was shouldering the actual burden of the struggle with the occupying powers, was suspicious and resentful of the emigres who lived safely abroad, and ruled with little regard for the concerns of the younger group. Bandera is not presented as the initiator of the split, but rather as a representative of a group which was, by its nature, incapable of continuing under the command of Mel'nyk's provid. While this is largely an accurate representation of Bandera's role in the split, it is also true that Bandera's personal feelings towards several of the major figures of the provid, and his fierce determination that "revolutionary" tactics be followed by the OUN, further ensured that a split could not be avoided.

The harsh years of imprisonment, which he in part blamed on the treachery of two emigre OUN officials, had left Bandera embittered: he had scores to settle with Omelian Senyk and Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi. Senyk was responsible for the "archive" which had made Bandera's case indefensible, while Baranovs'kyi was thought to be a police agent, who had given the Polish police further details about Bandera's activities during the interrogations leading up to the Warsaw trials. Even while still in prison, Bandera had sent out messages that Baranovs'kyi was a spy, and ordered that he be put under surveillance.[8]

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[7] Svatko, "Doba i Dolia," p. 1314.

[8] Bandera was convinced of Baranovs'kyi's treachery because the Polish police had confronted Bandera with information concerning the OUN's secret contacts at the Polish-Czech border; these contacts, which permitted OUN members to pass between Poland and Czechoslovakia, were known only by a very few senior OUN members, including Baranovs'kyi. Adding to the suspicion against Baranovs'kyi was that fact that his brother, Roman, had served as an agent for the Polish police. On Roman Baranovs'kyi see Zynovii

Bandera was equally distressed by the policy of Mel'nyk, who had been formally elected as leader of the OUN in August 1939, at the Second Great Congress of the OUN in Rome.[9] Me'lnyk's policy, in Bandera's eyes, represented an abandonment of the ideals and tactics of the movement: rather than working to stir the Ukrainian masses to national revolution, Mel'nyk's group seemed to be waiting for international developments --- such as a war between the Soviet Union and Germany --- to decide Ukraine's fate. Mel'nyk was abandoning political-propaganda work aimed at creating a revolutionary situation in Ukraine, and was allowing the OUN to revert to a UVO type organization that was purely military.[10] In Bandera's eyes, Mel'nyk and the provid had been abroad for so long that they had grown estranged from the krai group, and its revolutionary nationalism. Ironically, within five years --- after having spent three years in a foreign prison --- Bandera would find himself the object of the same sort of condemnation from the krai group.[11]

Bandera and the krai group had already been disappointed several times by Germany, and believed in a more broadly based alliance with the Western powers or with

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Knysh, Sprava Iaroslava Baranovs'koho-Makara (The Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi-Makar affair) (Cracow, 1940). Lev Rebet describes Bandera's accusations against Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi in detail, as it was recounted to him by one of Bandera's brothers. Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, pp. 74-76. Zynovii Knysh provides a detailed discussion of the krai group's mistrust towards the provid, including the arguments against Baranovs'kyi in his Bunt Bandery (n.p., 1950), pp. 23-25. This work was written under the pseudonym Bohdan Mykhailiuk. See Rozbrat - Spohady i materialy do rozkolu v OUN 1940 roku (Discord - memories and materials concerning the split in the OUN in 1940) (Toronto, 1960). Knysh vehemently denies that Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi was guilty of the charges levelled against him by Bandera.

[9] It is often pointed out by opponents of Melnyk that only two representatives of the krai were present at the Rome conference; this, it is argued, suggested that the conference was unrepresentative of the wishes of the movement as a whole. See Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, p. 95.

[10] Stepan Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia revoliutsiinoho provody OUN," (On the tenth anniversary of the formation of the revolutionary leadership of the OUN) (February 1950) Perspektyvy, pp. 173-175.

[11] Zynovii Knysh derives great satisfaction from the fact that, although the Bandera group criticized the provid for living abroad and growing estranged from the krai, for the duration of his career, Bandera himself remained abroad. Mykhaliuk (Knysh), Bunt Bandery, p. 41.

anti-Soviet nationalities, such as the Finns. With hindsight, these plans for an alliance with the Western powers seem naive, and none of them ever materialized. Nonetheless, the krai group was quite optimistic at the time that it could gain such support and thus avoid relying entirely on the Germans.[12]

In the eyes of Zynovii Knysh, the claim that Bandera's group was acting in the defense of the ideals of the Ukrainian national revolution is spurious. In truth, argues Knysh, Bandera and his group of supporters merely sought to satisfy their own blind ambitions to become leaders of the party themselves.[13] While ambition may well have played some role in the split, it is inappropriate to suggest that Bandera and his group did not have genuine tactical and ideological differences with the provid: the policy which was being followed by Mel'nyk was, at least in the eyes of Bandera and the bulk of the krai group, an abandonment of the principles of revolutionary nationalism for which they had fought and suffered imprisonment throughout the 1920s and 1930s.

In November 1939 Bandera went to Slovakia to nurse his rheumatism, which had reappeared during his stay in prison. In the company of several other discontented OUN members from the krai, also recovering from prison life, a renegade bloc began to formulate its platform and demands. Bandera was selected the leader of the rebel group because his reputation, stemming from his stand at the Warsaw trials, was greater than that of any of the other krai malcontents. Equally important, however, Bandera, in contrast to Mel'nyk, adhered to the new generation's goal to achieve Ukrainian independence by whatever means necessary.

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[12] Both Mykola Lebed' and Ievhen Stakhiv describe elaborate efforts to meet with American representatives. Lebed' went to the American Embassy in Rome, and also wrote to the editor of the Ukrainian-American newspaper Svoboda in an attempt to establish a contact with the American government. Mykola Lebed', Interview by Orest Subtelny, (12 June 1989). Ievhen Stakhiv corroborates this account. Ievhen Stakiv, Interview by Orest Subtelny, (13 June, 1989).

[13] Knysh, Bunt Bandery, p. 27.

From Slovakia, Bandera went to Vienna, where he was later joined by the then leader of the OUN(ZUZ), Volodymyr Lopatyns'kyi. The latter joined the ranks of the new bloc, and in January 1940, Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi went to Rome with a series of demands.[14] In 1950, Bandera wrote an account of the events leading up to the split in the OUN; according to his version, he and Lopatyns'kyi requested that the OUN become less dependent on Germany, and that Mel'nyk take the headquarters of the OUN to a neutral state. From there, they were to organize a Ukrainian legion to help the Finns in their fight against the Soviets.[15]

While the actual list of demands is disputed, it is agreed that the Bandera and Lopatyns'kyi demanded the dismissal of Baranovs'kyi, Senyk and Mykola Stsibors'kyi (also a member of the provid), and their replacement by members of the younger group. Mel'nyk firmly rejected this demand, and, according to Bandera, only accepted some very secondary demands. Consequently, on 10 February, Bandera was selected as the leader of a new, "revolutionary" provid, at a meeting in Cracow. Although there were several futile attempts at reconciliation, by the summer of 1940, after a series of minor physical clashes between supporters of the two groups over the control of various OUN buildings, all negotiations broke off; as the end of 1940 approached, the two groups were openly fighting in the streets of Cracow. Within a short time the group under the leadership of Bandera was calling itself the Banderivtsi (Bandera group); the supporters of Mel'nyk were designated as Mel'nykivtsi (Mel'nyk group).

Thus, Bandera's personal mistrust and hostility towards Baranovs'kyi and Senyk, and his tactical and ideological differences with Mel'nyk and the provid, in part precipitated the split within the OUN. Still, his importance to the split should not be over-emphasized. Bandera was joined in his opposition to Mel'nyk and the provid by the leading members of the krai group, such as Mykola Lebed', Iaroslav Stets'ko, and Roman Shukhevych. The majority of the members of the OUN regarded the provid with mistrust.[16] Moreover, the conflict over Carpatho-Ukraine, and other such disputes between the provid and the krai group, which sowed the seeds of discord within the OUN, took place while Bandera was still in prison.

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[14] According to Mykola Lebed', the decision to go to Rome with a series of demands was a group decision. Lebed', Interview, (New York, 10 October, 1992).

[15] Bandera, Stepan. "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia revoliutsiinoho provody OUN," pp. 171-189.

In March 1941 a conference titled the "Second Extraordinary Congress of the OUN" was held by the rebel faction of the OUN.[17] At this time, Bandera was officially designated the head of the new "revolutionary" OUN.

A similar process of polarization occurred in many of the other integral nationalist parties in Eastern Europe. While Hitler was the undisputed master of the Nazi party, in several of the other integral nationalist parties, there was no analogous figure. The founders of the Slovak and Croat integral nationalist parties, Andrej Hlinka and Josip Frank respectively --- as in the case of Ukraine's Konovalets' ---were dead. They were succeeded by relatively conservative leaders who favoured hierarchical rather than charismatic models of leadership --- Slovakia's Josef Tiso, and Croatia's Slavko Kvaternik. But, as with Mel'nyk, who was overshadowed by Bandera, these leaders were in turn each surpassed by a more fanatical rival who utilized a personalist style of leadership: in Slovakia Vojtech Tuka became the dominant force, while in Croatia, Ante Pavelic came to the forefront.[18]

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[16] Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, pp. 94-95.

[17] This conference was called the "Second Congress" of the OUN in rejection of the Rome conference which elected Mel'nyk.

[18] Armstrong, "Collaborationism in World War II," p. 402.

Preparation for War

By 1941 German preparations for war against the Soviet Union were well under way. In April Bandera informed Mykola Lebed' that the German Wehrmacht would permit the OUN(B ---Bandera) to form a military unit within the German Army. Bandera asked Lebed' if he would manage the recruitment of the unit.[19] Although officially only German officers commanded the unit, there was a staff of unofficial Ukrainian officers, headed by Roman Shukhevych.[20] The unit was given the name "Nachtigal" or Nightingale.

In the spring of 1941, Bandera met with officers of the German Wehrmacht, and came to an informal agreement that the OUN(B) would be free to carry out political activities in the Ukrainian territories conquered by the German army, provided that the Reich was allowed to organize the Ukrainian economy freely, in accordance with its war needs.[21] Bandera and leading officials of his party also attempted to come to an agreement with German political officials, but were unable to find any one willing to negotiate with them.[22]

As Bandera would later discover, while officers within the German Wehrmacht may have supported some form of Ukrainian autonomy, Hitler was determined that

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[19] Mykola Lebed', Interview by Orest Subtelny (12 June, 1989).

[20] According to Mykola Lebed' "Nachtigal" was not intended as a Ukrainian legion within the German army. Rather, it was formed with the purposes of supporting the future political projects of the OUN(B), such as the organization of a Ukrainian administration, the advancement of OUN(B) propaganda. If the German army took a negative stand towards the creation of a Ukrainian state, then the unit was under instructions to disband. Mykola Lebed', "Orhanizatsiia protynimets'koho oporu OUN 1941-1943 rokiv," (The organization of the anti-German base of the OUN, 1941-1943). Suchasnist' nos. 1-2(261-262) (January-February, 1983), pp. 149-150.

[21] See Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 52.

[22] Immediately before the war, Iaroslav Stets'ko, the head of the Political Bureau of the OUN, tried in vain to arrange a meeting with the foreign affairs Department of the Nazi party. Memorandum of the OUN, Berlin, 14 August, 1941, in Wolodymyr Kosyk, The Third Reich and the Ukrainian Question: Documents 1934-1944 (London, 1991), pp. 69-71.

Ukraine should become "Lebensraum" for Germans. Hitler's plans for Ukraine envisioned the settlement of a hundred million Germans in the occupied Eastern territories, and the extermination, resettlement, or Germanization of the rest of the population.[23]

In April Bandera began to organize a Ukrainian National Committee in Cracow, which was to serve as an umbrella group for all pro-independence Ukrainian parties.[24] The committee, which included a number of well respected Ukrainian political figures, was not formally founded until 22 June 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union had commenced.

The Arrival of Nachtigal in L'viv

As the German army, together with Bandera's Nachtigal, approached L'viv, Bandera again attempted to find out how the German political authorities regarded his plans to establish a Ukrainian state, but he was unable get a clear answer; many of the Wehrmacht officers declared that they did not have the authority to answer political questions.[25] Bandera even sent a letter to the Reich Chancellery, stating his intention of establishing a civil government in Ukraine.[26] Yet, while Bandera may have sent a statement of intent, warning that he was going to set up a government in Ukraine, he never received a response to his letter, or the approval of the German authorities.[27]

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[23] On Hitler's plans for Ukraine and Russia, see Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia: 1941-1945 (London, 1957), pp. 276-319. See also, Ihor Kamenetsky, Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies (New York, 1961).

[24] See Quick letter of SiPo and SD Chief about All-Ukrainian Council, (June 21, 1941), in Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.) Litopys ukrains'koi povstans'koi armii (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), vol. 21 (Toronto, 1991), pp. 17-20. The author of the letter, Miller, the Secret Police Chief in Berlin, took a negative view of the formation of this committee and suggested that the establishment of the committee be prevented.

[25] Bandera spoke with, among others, Dr. Hans Koch, a Wehrmacht officer, but Koch was unable to answer his questions. "Memorandum of the OUN," (Berlin, 14 August, 1941), in Kosyk, The Third Reich, pp. 69-71.

[26] "Niederschrift über die Rücksprache mit Mitgliedern des ukrainische Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera" (Minutes from the Consultation of the Ukrainian National Committee and Stepan Bandera) July 3, 1941, in Potichnyj (ed.), Litopys UPA, vol. 21, p. 44.

[27] Even the Wehrmacht officers with whom Bandera had made the informal agreement felt

On June 30, in the wake of Soviet atrocities, and in the midst of German atrocities, Nachtigal, as well as other scattered groups of Bandera's followers, reached L'viv. Some reports claim that Nachtigal also initiated and participated in pogroms against Jews, Poles, and members of the OUN(m), although such assertions are disputed by leading OUN(B) members, as well as by John Armstrong.[28] Lebed' and Stets'ko both claim that the unit had been charged with difficult political tasks, connected with the establishment of Ukrainian statehood, and was not about to bother with issues which, in their eyes, were clearly secondary. In the words of Stets'ko, "In general the Jewish or Polish factor was not a substantive matter. We had more weighty business, of importance to Ukrainian history, before us."[29]

The "Akt"

Taking advantage of the confused situation in L'viv, Stets'ko hastily assembled a

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betrayed when Bandera's party proclaimed the establishment of a Ukrainian state. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 53, n. 6.

[28] Alexander Dallin claims that the unit participated in pogroms in his German Rule in Russia, p. 119. He supports his claim with the following sources: W.Diewerge, ed., Deutsche Soldaten sehen die Sowjetunion (Berlin, 1941), p. 45; Einzatzgruppen Reports, July 16, August 9 and 28, 1941. Lebed', Rebet, and Stets'ko all deny that Nachtigal participated in such atrocities. (See Lebed', "Pravda Pro `Nachtigal'," Poklyk sumlinnia, nos. 5-6(19-20) (February, 1991), p. 2. Mykola Lebed', Interview by Orest Subtelny (12 June, 1989); Iaroslav Stets'ko, 30 Chervnia 1941: proholoshennia vidnovlennia derzhavnosty Ukrainy (30th of June 1941: Proclamation of the renewal of the independence of Ukraine) (Toronto, 1967), p. 178; Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, p. 99.) John Armstrong also states that he was unable to find any evidence indicating involvement of Nachtigal members in anti-Semitic atrocities. Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 54. Dan B. Chopyk, writing in the Ukrainian emigre journal Ukrainian Quarterly, argues that the allegations of war-crimes directed against Nachtigal were part of a Soviet attempt to discredit Dr. Theodor Oberländer (a German parliamentarian) and the West German government. Oberländer had served as the unit's liaison officer. According to Chopyk, a special West German Board investigated the claims and concluded that "The accusations against the battalion "Nachtigal" and Prof. Oberländer lack every foundation..." Dan B. Chopyk, "The Origin and Activities of the Nightingale Legion - DUN," Ukrainian Quarterly, XLII, nos. 1-2, pp. 69-80.

[29] Stets'ko, 30 Chervnia 1941, p. 178.

national representation that was to serve as the basis of the future Ukrainian government. That same evening, in a small room in the Prosvita society building, Stets'ko read a proclamation of the Ukrainian state:[30]

Act of Proclamation of the Ukrainian State[31]

> 1. By the will of the Ukrainian people, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the direction of Stepan Bandera proclaims the renewal of the Ukrainian State, for which a whole generation of the best sons of the Ukraine spilled its blood.
>
> The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which under the direction of its creator and leader Ievhen Konovalets' during the past decades of bloody Muscovite-Bolshevik subjugation carried on a stubborn struggle for freedom, calls upon the entire Ukrainian people not to lay down its arms until a Sovereign Ukrainian State is formed in all the Ukrainian lands.
>
> The sovereign Ukrainian government assures the Ukrainian people of regularity and order, multi-sided development of all its forces, and satisfaction of its demands.
>
> 2. In the western lands of Ukraine a Ukrainian government is created which will be subordinated to a Ukrainian national administration which will be created in the capital of Ukraine --- Kiev.
>
> 3. The Ukrainian national-revolutionary army, which is being created on Ukrainian soil, will continue to fight against the Muscovite occupation for a Sovereign All-Ukrainian State and a new, just order in the whole world.
> Long live the Sovereign Ukrainian State!
> Long live the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists!
> Long live the director of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists --- STEPAN BANDERA!
> The City of L'viv, June 30, 1941, 8.P.M.
> Head of National Congress
> Iaroslav Stets'ko.

More important than the proclamation of the akt at the Prosvita society, was the fac that Bandera's supporters had managed to gain access to the L'viv radio station. Consequently, Stets'ko was able to broadcast the akt. This gave the Ukrainian public the impression that Bandera's government must have been approved by the Germans.

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[30] The major pro-Bandera sources dealing with the "akt" are: Petro Mirchuk, Akt vidnovlennia ukrains'koi derzhavnosty, 30 chervnia 1941 (The Act of Renewal of Ukrainian Statehood, June 30, 1941). (New York, 1952) and Stets'ko, 30 chervnia 1941.

[31] The akt is available in two versions. The version printed above is a translation by John Armstrong, based on a typewritten copy of the proclamation furnished to him by Volodymyr Stakhiv, a member of the "government." Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 56-57. The second version was printed in the Zhovkivs'ki Visti, 'Organ of the OUN' (10 July 1941). It includes the phrases "Glory to the heroic German Army and its Führer, Adolf Hitler!" and "Ukraine for the Ukrainians!" An original typed copy of the Zhovkivs'ki Visti may be found at the Ukrainian Canadian Archives and Museum in Edmonton, Alberta.

As the American historian of twentieth-century Ukraine, Basil Dmytryshyn, concludes, the akt had three objectives: 1) to present the Germans with a fait accompli of Ukrainian independence; 2) to outmanoeuvre the Mel'nyk faction for leadership among the Ukrainians[32]; 3) to serve as a symbol of Ukrainian aspirations for an independent state.[33] John S. Reshetar Jr. argues that the akt, whether it succeeded or not, was intended for posterity as a symbolic act, adding to the Ukrainian nationalist mythology, and to the historical legends that link generations.[34] Celebrations surrounding previous Ukrainian declarations of independence were central to the nationalist mythology described in the last chapter. Bandera knew that a new declaration would become another "holy day" in the nationalist calendar. Even a few short weeks after the declaration, the OUN(B)'s propaganda branch was declaring that the akt :

> is already an historical fact that will become one of the most glorious traditions of the Ukrainian people. The proclamation of June 30, 1941, will become a symbol of the present liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation, just as the acts of January 22, 1918, in Kiev, and November 1, 1918, in L'viv, became symbols of the Ukrainian war of liberation of 1917-1921.[35]

Bandera also knew that his prestige, and that of his party, would be raised by the akt, which declared Bandera the leader of the party responsible for it. Yet, Bandera sought more than a new symbol for the nationalist mythology: he believed that this new myth --- like the myth of Bilas and Danylyshyn, or of his stand at the Warsaw trial --- could serve to

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[32] Zynovii Knysh argues that this was a major reason for the akt. Bunt Bandery, p. 76. For Knysh's numerous criticisms of the akt, see pp. 72-80.

[33] Basil Dmytryshyn, as quoted in "Ukrainians in World War II: Views and Points," Nationalities Papers, X, no. 1 (Spring 1982), p. 12.

[34] Ibid., p. 30.

[35] "Statement of the Political Bureau of the OUN," (Berlin 21 July 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, pp. 62-63.

"activate" the Ukrainian masses, and thus spark a national uprising. Thus, the akt as a symbol was a new weapon in Bandera's propaganda arsenal. Meanwhile, it also served to further entrench an already existing symbol --- himself. While the akt itself was the "holy grail" of Ukrainian statehood, he was the "banner" under which they were to rally in the struggle to attain it.

German Reaction to the Akt

Bandera's attempts to present the German government with a fait accompli precipitated a harsh response from the German secret police. When an SS Einsatzgruppe (task force) arrived in L'viv the day after the proclamation, it surveyed the situation in the city and, on 5 July, dispersed the government. Stets'ko, the head of the government, was not arrested until 12 July. Even before the Secret Police arrived in L'viv, they had made arrangements for measures to be taken against Bandera.[36]

When the German administration was informed about the akt, Bandera, who was then in Cracow, was escorted by the police to meet with the deputy Governor of the General Government, Büller. Büller had also gathered other members of Bandera's National Committee.[37] Büller turned to Bandera and asked him who proclaimed the government in L'viv, and under whose orders. "My people and under my orders," replied Bandera. Büller angrily demanded that Bandera revoke the akt, but Bandera brusquely refused, and the two exchanged sharp words. But rather than having Bandera arrested then and there, Büller regained his composure and let Bandera leave.

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[36] Chief of the Security Police and the SD, "Report on Events in the USSR No 15," (2 July 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 48.

[37] This account of Bandera's meeting with Deputy Governor Büller is based on V. Andriievs'kyi's (Deputy head of the Ukrainian National Committee in Cracow) account. It is quoted in Mirchuk, Akt vidnovlennia, pp. 38-39.

On 3 July Bandera was placed under house arrest in Cracow.[38] On the same day, he and the other members of his Ukrainian National Committee were gathered together for a "discussion" with the Undersecretary of State, Ernst Kundt. At the beginning of the gathering Kundt commented that the government in L'viv was established without the approval or knowledge of the German authorities.[39] He then observed that, although the Bandera group had illusions of being "allies" of the Germans, "...the Führer is the only person leading the struggle and there are no Ukrainian allies. Perhaps the Ukrainians are full of enthusiasm and feel that they are our allies; however, according to the terminology of constitutional law, we are not allies, but rather conquerors of the Soviet Russian Regions." Kundt explained that the entire region was a "field of operations" and that, accordingly, no political decisions could be made with regard to Ukraine, until the war with the Soviet Union was over.

Kundt asked Bandera, who arrived while the meeting was already in progress, a series of questions to determine whether he was responsible for the orders declaring the government in L'viv. "I gave instructions," replied Bandera, "for the immediate establishment of an administration and government in the regions occupied by the German troops. I gave this order long before the war began." Bandera added, moreover, that the government had "already formed itself and was working with the aim of collaborating... I have given instructions that everything be done in agreement with the Germans." Because the OUN represents the Ukrainian people, explained Bandera, and because it had been leading the national struggle against Poland and the Soviet Union, it was entitled to form a government. Kundt retorted that "The German Wehrmacht and the Führer, who conquered this land, have the right to form a government." As the discussion drew to a close, Bandera made a defiant final statement, vaguely reminiscent of his Warsaw trial performance:

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[38] Chief of the Security Police and the SD, "Report on Events in the USSR" (3 July, 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 49.

[39] "Niederschrift über die Rücksprache mit Mitgliedern des ukrainische Nationalkomitees und Stepan Bandera" (Minutes from the consultation with the Ukrainian National Committee and Stepan Bandera) July 3, 1941. Potichnyj (ed.), Litopys UPA, vol. 21, pp. 39-46.

> I would like to reiterate and clarify that, as regards all the orders I gave, I did not appeal for any instructions or approval from the German authorities. On giving all my orders, I did not appeal to any German authorities or seek approval of German authorities, but relied exclusively on the mandate which I received from the Ukrainian people. Only Ukrainians can establish and organize Ukrainian life in the areas inhabited by Ukrainians and this can only take place if Ukrainian factors are taken into consideration. But it is my opinion that this must be done provisionally, and with the agreement of the Germans.

Kundt callously concluded that "Only Adolf Hitler can determine what will happen there." From this discussion, it is apparent that Bandera would have settled for rather nominal Ukrainian independence under German tutelage (i.e., the status of a "quisling regime" such as Norway, Croatia or Slovakia). Yet, one can hardly doubt that for Bandera this would only have been a tactical manoeuvre on his part, designed to advance his campaign for full independence, and his crusade against the Soviet regime. He was not a Germanophile, although he recognized the practical necessity of collaborating with the Germans. Yet, Bandera was not permitted to collaborate. Hence, it would be more accurate to term Bandera an "aspiring collaborator" than a "collaborator."

On 6 July Bandera was transferred to Berlin where he remained under house arrest.[40] Yet he was permitted to continue his attempts to convince the German government not to liquidate the L'viv government. In August, he even wrote a letter directly to Hitler, protesting that Galicia remained annexed to the General Government (the German administrative unit that contained most of the territory of the former Polish state), and that Northern Bukovyna had been transferred to Rumania. Presumptuously, Bandera also hinted that he was not closing the door to further negotiations with Germany, provided that there were chances for maintaining the sovereignty of Ukrainian lands.[41]

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[40] Chief of the Security Police and the SD, "Report on Events in the USSR" (July 7, 1941), in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 53.

The Banderivtsi vs. the Mel'nykivtski

Mel'nyk's supporters have long claimed that Bandera, or his party, were responsible for a variety of political murders of OUN(M) supporters. The most spectacular of these murders was that of Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, which took place in August 1941. While the OUN(B) has always claimed that it was not responsible for their murder, claiming instead that it was the act of either Soviet or German agents, the weight of evidence favours the Mel'nyk group's claims.[42] According to a "nonparty" reporter in the newpaper Nastup, Bandera had proclaimed long before the attack that Senyk and Stsibors'kyi would be the first he would destroy in the Ukrainian lands.[43]

In the following months, a number of similar political assassinations are said to have been committed by the Bandera group.[44] Moreover, the factional conflict took on a local dimension, as peasants and villages joined the ranks of one or other faction and proceeded to make battle with one another.[45] The fratricidal struggle between the two factions within the OUN brought forth the wrath of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, who declared that "Ukraine needs no enemies when Ukrainians themselves are their own enemies, who despise one another and are not even ashamed of their hatred!"[46]

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[41] Reichskanzlei 12039-L. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, (3 August 1941). Reprinted in Ihor Kamenets'kyi, "Dokumenty pro ukrains'kykh partyzaniv," (Documents on Ukrainian partisans). Ukrains'kyi istoryk, 25, no. 1-4(97-100)(1988), pp. 192-93.

[42] Armstrong outlines the opposing arguments of Mel'nyk and Bandera supporters in Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 68-69. According to Armstrong, the following suggest that Bandera's group was responsible for the attack: 1) the victims had been bitterly denounced by the Bandera group; 2) the fact that Bandera followers distributed leaflets immediately following the attack justifying it; 3) the existence of a secret directive, stating that the victims were not to be allowed to reach Kiev. The Bandera group's claims that the murderers were agents of NKVD seem somewhat unconvincing. If the NKVD was responsible for the attack, this may become known soon, owing to the accessibility of Soviet archives.

[43] Nastup, October 11, 1941, p. 4. As quoted in Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 68.

[44] The Mel'nyk group also claims that the following were assassinated by Bandera's supporters: Roman Sushko, Iaroslav Baranovs'kyi, Ut'o Sokolovs'kyi, Ivan Mytsyk and Ihor Shubs'kyi. Mykhaliuk (Knysh), Bunt Bandery, p. 101.

[45] See Volodymyr Kubiiovych, Ukraintsi v Heneralnii Hubernii: 1939-1941 (Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement: 1939-1941) (Chicago, 1975), pp. 341-342.

The March Groups and the UPA

Before the outbreak of war, Bandera had planned an operation designed to extend the scope of OUN(B) operations to Eastern Ukraine. In the months before the war, pokhidni hrupy, or task forces (literally march groups) had been assembled to act as propagandists and organizers in Eastern Ukraine. The task forces were divided into several groups, each of which had specific destinations in Eastern Ukraine. Throughout the summer of 1941, the task forces had some success in carrying out their plans; they were aided somewhat in their task by the Nachtigal unit.[47]

More importantly, in Bandera's absence, the OUN followed the bold course of supporting the development of a partisan army --- the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA --- Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia).[48] While it is spurious to claim that Bandera was in any way responsible for the founding of the UPA, he was, as Zynovii Knysh puts it, "obsessed with the idea of launching an insurgency against the Bolsheviks. This was his idée fixée --- everyone who went to do underground work in the krai [in 1940], or who came from there with news or information, was entrusted by him with the preparation of a military insurgency."[49]

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[46] Sheptyts'kyi discusses the murders between the OUN factions in his 1942 pastoral letter entitled "Thou Shalt Not Kill." It is reprinted in Pys'ma poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho, ChSVV (Pastoral letters of Metropolitan Andrii Sheptyt'kyi from the time of the German occupation) (Yorkton, Sask., 1969), pp. 230-231.

[47] There are a number of memoirs dealing with the activities of these task forces. Much of Mykola Klymyshyn's memoirs, V pokhodi do voli, discuss the activities of his Southern task force. See also, Lev Shankovs'kyi's Pokhidni hrupy OUN (March Groups of the OUN) (Munich, 1958); Zynovii Matla, Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa (The Southern Task Force) (Munich, 1952).

[48] The OUN did not actually found the UPA, but rather took over and developed a partisan army which already existed by that name. See Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, pp. 112-114.

[49] Zynovii Knysh, Rozbrat, pp. 371-372.

The activities of the UPA are one of the most dramatic and intriguing chapters of the history of Ukraine during the Second World War.[50] Their partisan warfare against both the Soviet and German armies continued until 1950, when they were liquidated by NKVD units. Recent evidence suggests that at the height of its strength, UPA had between 150,000 and 200,000 members.[51]

Bandera in Sachsenhausen

In September 1941, Bandera was moved to the central Gestapo prison in Berlin, where he was placed under full arrest. In March of 1943 Bandera was again moved, this time to the Sachsenhausen prison camp near Orianiensburg, 30 kilometres north of Berlin. Sachsenhausen was one of the most brutal of Nazi concentration camps. Often its inmates were killed in perverse rituals, where they were forced to run until they died of exhaustion. Furthermore, inhumane scientific experiments were carried out on many of the inmates.

Sachsenhausen prison camp contained a special "prison within a prison" which was separated from the regular barracks of the prison by a brick wall. It was in this special prison, known by Sachsenhausen inmates as "the bunker," that Bandera was kept.

Soviet historians and publicists have generally claimed that Bandera lived in special quarters that were "almost luxurious," and was given special privileges by the Germans.[52] V. Bezkhlibnyk, who served with Bandera in Sachsenhausen, admits that Bandera was offered special comforts and privileges by the Germans, but he claims that Bandera rejected them because he wanted to be treated the same as the other nationalist inmates, who were not granted such privileges.[53] Apparently, Bandera's health deteriorated as a result of the prison conditions (for example, the glands in his throat enlarged) but he was able to receive minimal treatment from the camp hospital.[54]

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[50] On the history of the UPA, see Mykola Lebed', UPA: Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (UPA: The Ukrainian Insurgent Army)(n.p., 1946.); O. Martovych, The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Munich, 1950). For a detailed collection of German, Soviet and UPA documents, see Peter J. Potichnyj and Ievhen Shtendera (eds.) Litopys ukrains'koi povtans'koi armii (Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army), 23 vols (Toronto, 1977-1991).

[51] See David R. Marples, Stalinism in Ukraine in the 1940s (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 58, 68-69.

[52] See, for example, Bandera: prapor chy banda? (Bandera: banner or bandit?) Radians'ka Ukraina (10 October, 1990).

Throughout his stay in Sachsenhausen, which lasted almost until the end of the war, Bandera was completely cut off from his party. Only on one occasion was he able to smuggle a brief note out to his supporters and his wife.[55] Ironically, Bandera was imprisoned in Sachsenhausen together with Mel'nyk --- his old OUN rival, although they only met once, under somewhat surreal circumstances, in February 1944.[56]

Thus, during the course of the war, Bandera came face to face with the realities of Nazi brutality in Sachsenhausen. He would also later discover that his brothers Oleksander and Vasyl' had been murdered in Auschwitz, another notorious German death camp.[57]

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[53] For an interesting account of Bandera's stay at Sachsenhausen by a fellow nationalist inmate, see V. Bezkhlibnyk, "U voienni dni" (Wartime) Homin Ukrainy, XII, no. 1-2(555-556) (7 January, 1960).

[54] Ibid.

[55] Lebed', Interview, (New York, 10 October, 1992).

[56] The wing of the "bunker" in which Bandera was kept was separated from that in which Mel'nyk was kept by a divider. At one point along the divider there was a thick pane of glass. The inmates on the opposite sides of the glass communicated to each other through writing on the glass with chalk. One day Mel'nyk walked up to this glass and noticed that the name of one of his friends, Ol'zhych, had been painted on the glass with a cross beside it, signifying his death. Mel'nyk was quite disturbed by the news and shouted through the glass at a man standing on the other side, "Who are you?" The man proceeded to write his name on the glass ---"Stepan Bandera." Andrii Mel'nyk, in OUN: 1929-1954 (n.p., 1955), p. 31.

[57] Roman Malashchuk served in the Auschwitz prison camp with Bandera's two brothers. He gives a detailed account of their stay in his memoir Z knyhy moho zhyttia: spomyny --- vyrostesh ty synu, vyrushysh v dorohu (English Title: From the Book of My Life: Memoirs --- You'll Grow up my Son and Find Your Way, Vol. I (Toronto, 1987).

The New OUN

While Bandera witnessed Nazi atrocities from within the walls of Sachsenhausen, those OUN(B) members who were actively operating in Eastern Ukraine saw the brutal exploitation of the Ukrainian population by the Nazis. Not wanting to uphold an ideology that was in any way kindred to Nazism, the wartime leadership of the OUN increasingly began to cast aside its integral-nationalist and quasi-fascist outlook. More importantly, the process of ideological revision was necessitated by the political realities of Eastern Ukraine.

A new, social-democratic orientation in the OUN was officially adopted at the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the OUN, which took place in August 1943.[58] Illustrative of the influence of Eastern Ukrainians on the OUN's new ideology is a resolution proclaiming the need for "state ownership of large industry and co-operative ownership of small industry,"[59] and the statement that the OUN was dedicated to the abolition of "all forms of exploitation of one class by another."[60] Other resolutions of the Assembly called for "freedom of press, speech, thought, convictions, worship and world view," and for the "freedom to profess and practice any religion which does not run counter to the morals of society."[61] Finally, the Führerprinzip was rejected in favour of a "bureau provid," comprising three members, that seems to have been modelled on the Soviet government, which from time to time was led by "troikas."[62] When the new bureau provid was selected, comprised of Roman Shukhevych, Zinovyi Matla, and Dmytro Maivs'kyi, Bandera was left an ordinary member of the party.

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[58] For an English language text of the Assembly and its resolutions see Peter J. Potichnyj and Ievhen Shtendera, Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground: 1943-1951 (Edmonton, 1986), pp. 331-353. The original text may be found in OUN v svitli postanov velykykh zboriv, pp. 90-120.

[59] Potichnyj, Political Thought, p. 344.

[60] Ibid., p. 339.

[61] Ibid., p. 345.

[62] See Myroslav Prokop, "U sorokrichchia III nadzvychainoho velykoho zboru OUN," (On the fortieth anniversary of the 3rd extraordinary grand assembly of the OUN) Suchasnist' nos. 7-8 (1983), p. 60.

In July 1944, another body, the Ukrains'ka Holovna Vyzvol'na Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, or UHVR), was formed by the OUN(B) and UPA to "unite and co-ordinate the activities of all the pro-independence liberation forces of the Ukrainian people." Its ideological and political platform resembled that adopted at the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the OUN, and it retained close ties with the leadership of the UPA.[63]

The new ideological platform of the OUN was a very significant departure from the quasi-fascist Ukrainian nationalism advocated by Dmytro Dontsov. Still, Dontsov's worldview would remain the basis of Bandera's outlook until Bandera's death. This fact is the basic reason for the post-war split within the OUN(B).

The End of the War

As the war drew to a close, the Minister of the Eastern Occupied Territories, Alfred Rosenberg, was permitted to release Ukrainian nationalists, such as Bandera and Mel'nyk, in the hope of organizing Ukrainian military units to be used against the Soviets. According to one of Bandera's fellow nationalist inmates, V. Bezkhlibnyk, one day in September 1944, representatives of the UPA came to Sachsenhausen, and were permitted a private, confidential meeting with Bandera, concerning the question of collaboration with the Germans.[64] But, continues Bezkhlibnyk, Bandera refused to even consider negotiations with the Germans until his fellow nationalist political prisoners were released; consequently, when Bandera was released from Sachsenhausen on 25 September 1944, roughly forty other Ukrainian nationalists were released with him.[65]

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[63] An English translation of the Platform and organization of the UHVR is found in Potichnij and Shtendera, Political Thought, pp. 355-376.

[64] Bezkhlibnyk's account seems somewhat suspect in that it states that the UPA representatives "refused to even begin any negotiations with the Germans without the agreement of their leader." There is no doubt that the UPA leadership undertook negotiations with the Germans before this time. (See Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationlism, ch. vii.; Dallin, German Rule, p. 622.) Considering that Bandera had no official position within the OUN by this time, it is hardly likely that representatives of the UPA would have seen Bandera as their "leader." Bezkhlibnyk's account, which was printed in the Bandera party newspaper Homin Ukrainy, may be in part an attempt to exaggerate Bandera's influence over the UPA; it should be considered in the context of the struggle for legitimacy

The German government, which by late 1944 was well on its way to defeat, was desperate to gain allies even among Slavs. Accordingly, the Germans attempted to form a Ukrainian national committee, and sought a leading Ukrainian nationalist to head the committee. Bandera was unwilling to take the position himself, but suggested that the Germans speak with Dr. Horbovyi, an OUN(B) member who had formerly been a key member of Bandera's Cracow committee.[66] The Germans were unable to come to an agreement with Horbovyi, so they then turned to Mel'nyk, who drafted a series of demands to be accepted by the Germans before the nationalists would collaborate with them. Bandera and other leading nationalists agreed to Mel'nyk's proposals, which included German recognition of Ukraine's right to an independent state, and the right to independent armed forces.[67] Gottlieb Berger, a high ranking SS officer who took part in the negotiations with the nationalists, described Bandera, in a letter to Himmler, as an "able, ardent," "fanatic Slav" who was "at present extremely valuable for us, later dangerous."[68] The Germans were unable to accept these demands, and thus looked beyond the nationalist leaders for support for its committee.[69]

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connected with the post-war split within the OUN.

[65] Armstrong gives the date of Bandera's release as September 27 (Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 138) while Dallin gives the date as 25 September (German Rule, p. 624).

[66] Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 138.

[67] Ibid., p. 141.

[68] Berger, memorandum, October 6, 1944 as quoted in ibid., p. 139 and Dallin, German Rule, p. 625.

[69] Pavlo Shandruk, a former officer in the army of the UNR, chose to accept the position, apparently with the blessing of Bandera and Mel'nyk. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, p. 139. On Shandruk's rationale for cooperating with the Germans, and his subsequent role in the creation of the "Ukrainian National Army," at the very end of the war, see Pavlo Shandruk, Arms of Valor (New York, 1958).

A decade after the war, when Bandera looked back upon his role and that of Ukrainians in it, he was characteristically unapologetic:

> We, the entire Ukrainian people, have no [culpability] regarding our activities during Second World War period, which calls for the judgement of foreigners. And this is the stand that all Ukrainians should always join together and take. For we had two fronts, two enemies at once, and not one friend...We have not sought foreign judges, nor do we have to...[70]

After the War

In the spring of 1945, after the war had ended, Bandera met with the representatives of the new OUN (Vasyl' Okhrymovych, Myroslav Prokop, Dariia Rebet and Mykola Lebed') in Vienna. From the very beginning, it was obvious that Bandera and the new leaders of the OUN would find it difficult to work in harmony.[71] While Bandera continued to regard himself as the leader of the OUN, the new OUN leadership saw him as a relic from the past, out of touch with the changes that the OUN had undergone during the war.[72] Nonetheless, Bandera and the others formed themselves into the Foreign Centre of the OUN; Bandera soon came to dominate the group, owing in part to his greater popularity within the emigre community. Afterwards, the Centre moved to Munich (which was at that time rapidly becoming the centre of the Ukrainian emigre community) and renamed itself the Zakordonna Chastyna OUN (Foreign Branch of the OUN, or ZCh OUN).

Between 1946 and 1950, the ZCh OUN was divided between the supporters of the new, or revisionist program of the OUN, and those surrounding Bandera, who supported the pre-war program. Moreover, the ZCh OUN was also opposed by the so-called

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[70] Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu stvorennia revoliutsiinoho provody OUN," p. 188.

[71] The major work dealing with the ideological debates and political conflicts within the OUN(B) following the war is Roman Krychevs'kyi's (pseud. of Roman Ilnyts'kyi), Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv v Ukraini, Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv zakordonom i ZCh OUN (The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Ukraine, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists abroad and the ZCh OUN) (New York, 1962).

[72] Mykola Lebed', Interview by Orest Subtelny (12 June, 1989).

Zakordonne Prestavnytstvo UHVR (Foreign Representation of the UHVR), which also accepted the new ideology of the OUN, and claimed to be the only legal representatives of the UPA.

Bandera and the leadership of the ZCh OUN at first attempted to maintain a public show of unity, by suppressing public demonstrations of disunity. But when a conflict between Bandera and the ZCh OUN's official organ ---Ukrains'ka trybuna (The Ukrainian Tribune) --- resulted in the resignation of the journal's entire editorial staff, Bandera decided to fight the revisionists in a public forum. In 1948, an Extraordinary Conference of the ZCh OUN was held; at this time, Bandera, who obviously had greater support than the revisionists, had several of its leading representatives removed.[73]

Bandera vs. the Revisionists

In 1950, the revisionists established another journal, Ukrains'kyi samostiinyk (The Ukrainian Independentist). In the same year, Bandera contributed a lengthy article to this journal, outlining in detail his stand towards the opposition. In so doing he launched his first attack in a polemical war between the ZCh OUN and the oppositionists that would continue for decades.[74]

For Bandera, the revisionists' departure from an authoritarian revolutionary-political structure to a democratic party structure, and towards democracy in general, was nothing more than a tactical manoeuvre designed to gain support from the West. Western democracy was a foreign notion not suited to the revolutionary stuggle at hand; indeed, it was a "contradiction of Ukrainian nationalism."[75] That communist states which called themselves democratic, such as the German Democratic Republic, were at the same time communist regimes, was an illustration, in Bandera's mind, of the ideological kinship between democracy and Communism. The revisionists' accepted humanistic principles also adopted officially by communist regimes, such as the support of freedom of religion; the rejection of discrimination on the basis of nationality; and the need for social equality. For Bandera, the acceptance of such principles --- especially the revisionists' advocation of a "classless society" ---signalled a shift towards Marxism. While the oppositionists argued that Russian imperialism and Marxism-Leninism were the enemies of the Ukrainian people, not the Russian nationality itself, Bandera rejected this view, arguing instead that the Russian people had always supported and initiated imperialism, either Tsarist or Bolshevik, and were thus the enemies of the Ukrainian people.[76]

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[73] Ibid., p. 23.

[74] Stepan Bandera, "Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia a ne til'ky protyrezhymnyi rezystans," (The Ukrainian national revolution, and not a mere resistance against the regime), Perspektyvy, pp. 130-170. Originally printed in Ukrains'kyi samostiinyk throughout 1950. Bandera's ideological differences with the opposition, as outlined in this article, are examined in detail in Krychevs'kyi (Il'nyts'kyi), pp. 24-42.

Nonetheless, Bandera claimed to reject racism; in particular, he rejected "German racism-imperialism and national socialism."[77] Lastly, the revisionists believed that it was not the OUN's concern whether an individual accepted materialist or idealist philosophical principles. For Bandera, it was unacceptable for Ukrainian nationalists to accept materialism, since the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian national revolution were founded on spiritual principles.

Spanning all these ideological questions, and forming a separate component of the debate between Bandera and the revisionists, was the legacy of Dmytro Dontsov. In the view of the revisionists, Donsov had had a negative influence on the national movement, specifically because his doctrine of "amorality" had undermined the moral fabric of the movement.[78] But to Bandera, who had devoted his life to fighting for Dontsov's version of Ukrainian nationalist ideology, Dontsov was and remained the authority on ideological questions. Bandera's party apparatus, much to the displeasure of the OUN in Ukraine, even officially took Dontsov under their protection and supported him financially.[79] In 1953, Bandera even offered Dontsov the position of editor of a new party journal.[80]

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[75] Krychevs'kyi (Il'nyts'kyi), OUN v Ukraini, p. 33.

[76] See Bandera, "Z moskaliamy nema spil'noi movy" (There is no common language with the Russians) (1952), Perspektyvy, p. 270.

[77] Bandera, "Ukrains'ka natsional'na revoliutsiia," p. 162.

The new UHVR's program, like the program of the OUN in Ukraine, which was based on the Third Extraordinary Grand Assembly of the OUN, was designed in the first place to win over Ukrainians under Soviet rule. It failed to bring about an uprising of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union; it was certainly not calculated to appeal to the nationalist Ukrainian emigre community living in the West, comprised, as it was, mainly of Galicians who had grown up under similar circumstances to Bandera's. Thus, in the post-war emigre community, Bandera's organization was clearly at an advantage relative to the revisionists.

In 1950, couriers from Ukraine brought a large number of documents from Ukraine testifying to the new ideological orientation of the OUN in Ukraine. From this point on, there could have been no doubt in Bandera's mind that the OUN in Ukraine had rejected the nationalism of Dontsov, and stood in favour of the revisionism he so adamantly rejected. Thus, Bandera, who originally came to power in the name of the "will of the krai," now stood in opposition to this same will. Yet, by the early 1950s, the OUN in Ukraine was on the verge of being wiped out, and, as noted, the emigre revisionists had little support abroad, so Bandera retained his authority.[81]

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[78] Krychevs'kyi (Il'nyts'kyi), OUN v Ukraini, pp 40-41, 81-82.
[79] Ibid., p. 82.
[80] A letter from Bandera to D. Chaikovs'kyi (dated 25 March 1953) concerning this proposal is printed in M. Sosnovs'kyi's Dmytro Dontsov, pp. 198-199.
[81] On Bandera's refusal to accept the "will of the krai" see Krychevs'kyi (Il'nyts'kyi), OUN v Ukraini. pp. 50-110. The view of Bandera's supporters concerning this period is presented in S. Mechnyk, Pochatok nevidomoho: Spohady 1945-1954. (Beginning of the

Bandera's and Dontsov's Return to Christianity

In part because of the practical demands of wartime politics, Dontsov abandoned his virulent anti-clericism by the 1940s. In a 1949 essay Dontsov asked the rhetorical question 'For what kind of Ukraine are we fighting?' His response was clear: nationalists should be fighting against the Russian-communist devil for "our own truth and God" and for the "idea of our nation --- the idea of Christian culture. The idea of active, faithful, warlike Christianity."[82] Bandera kept pace with his old mentor. In 1954 he echoed Dontsov's new Christian stand in a denunciation of the UHVR's liberal policy towards religion: "The Ukrainian nationalist, revolutionary movement...is a Christian movement":

> Its principal root is Christian, and it is not merely tolerant of Christianity. Regarding the worldview of Ukrainian nationalism, we consider our source to be the spirituality and culture of the Ukrainian nation. And that nation is profoundly Christian, and has developed under the thousand-year formative influence of Christianity.[83]

Bandera also actively promoted the Ukrainian Catholic church in Germany after the war.[84] For Bandera, Ukrainian integral nationalism and Christianity were entirely compatible, for "the defense of great truths," such as the Ukrainian liberation struggle, "draws the human soul closer to God, than life itself." For both Dontsov and Bandera, the struggle against Russia was thus not only one of national liberation, but it was also a holy war against an atheistic foe seeking to destroy the Christian soul of the Ukrainian nation.[85] Evidently,

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unknown: Memoirs 1945-1954) (Munich, 1984), pp. 205-230.

[82] Dmytro Dontsov, "Za iaku Ukrainu?" VII, No. 7(93) (July, 1955) Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, p. 25.

[83] Stepan Bandera, "Proty fal'shuvannia vyzvol'nykh pozytsii," (Against the falsification of the positions of the liberation movement) (1954) in Stepan Bandera Perspektyvy ukrains'koi revoliutsii, pp. 322-327.

[84] This is testified to by the statements of Ukrainian church officials. See Platon Korniliak, "U pokloni Stepanovi Banderi," XXXVI, no. 44(2147) Homin Ukrainy, (31 October, 1984), p. 4; Danylo Chaikovs'kyi, Moskovs'ki vbyvtsi Bandery pered sudom, pp. 492-494.

[85] Stepan Bandera, "Z nevycherpnoho dzherela" (From the inexhaustible source) (1957) in Perspectyvy, pp. 355-359.

Bandera was not alone in his belief that integral-nationalism and Christianity were compatible: after his death, many representative of both the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox church praised Bandera as a great Christian.[86]

The OUN(B)'s Quest for Legitimacy

In the post-war period all the major factions of the OUN looked to recent history to demonstrate their legitimacy as the true leaders of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle. For the UHVR, its ties with the UPA, which led the partisan struggle against the Soviets, demonstrated its legitimacy. The OUN(M) looked to the role of its leading figures in the UVO, and the supposed designation of Mel'nyk as leader by Konovalets'.

Since Bandera and Stets'ko (the Premier of the L'viv government) played especially dominant roles in the history of the of L'viv government, it is natural that they would have retroactively sought to glorify the akt. In a 1948 essay, Bandera took great pains to defend the decision to proclaim independence in L'viv, and argues that the akt was a manifestation of the Ukrainian nation's age-old struggle for freedom and independence.[87] Other historical works by Bandera supporters dealing with the akt, including a major work by Stets'ko, also paint the akt as a central event in modern Ukrainian history.[88] Significantly, Dmytro Dontsov, who contributed a preface and an essay to Stets'ko's book, took great pains to equate the akt with previous national uprisings in Ukrainian history, such as Mazepa's 18th century uprising, or Petliura's independence bid between 1918-1920. For

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[86] Chaikovs'kyi, Moskovs'ki vbyvtsi Bandery pered sudom, pp. 481-482.

[87] Bandera, "Slovo do ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv-revoliutsiioneriv zakordonom," (A word to Ukrainian nationalist-revolutionaries abroad)(1948), Perspektyvy, pp. 86-90.

[88] Petro Mirchuk's 1952 book Akt vidnovlennia ukrains'koi derzhavnosty 30 chervnia 1941 roky: ioho geneza ta politychne i istorychne znachennia (Act of renewal of Ukrainian statehood of 30 June 1941: its genesis, political and historical significance) (New York, 1952), begins (p. 3.) by stating that "The Act of renewal of Ukrainian statehood of 30 June 1941 under the initiative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by Stepan Bandera, was an act of great historical importance, not only in the history of the modern Ukrainian nationalist movement, but in the history of the Ukrainian nation."

Dontsov, Bandera's "state idea," like Mazepa's, was immortal. Through the akt, Bandera "activated" a generation of Ukrainian nationalists.[89] Thus, just as the akt had been used during the war as a symbol to spark national resistance, it was used by Bandera and his party after the war as a symbol demonstrating their legitimacy as the true leaders of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle. But the akt was far from being the party's most powerful symbol. Their most powerful symbol was Bandera himself. In 1959, when he was assassinated by a KGB agent, this symbol became almost irresistible.

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[89] Dmytro Dontsov, "30 Chervnia i suchasni shasheli" (30 June and contemporary wood-worms) in Stets'ko, 30 Chervnia 1941, p. 341.

CHAPTER IV

THE BANDERA MYTH

Who gave you immortality, and for what?
Who prolonged your days, and for what?

Speak, shout it out, so that all may learn,
And once and for all, know it:
Mortals gave you immortality,
Mortals prolonged your days! ...

Geniuses! Immortals!
On your knees before the mortals!

Vasyl' Symonenko[1]

The Image of Bandera in Wartime Propaganda

It would have come as a shock for many Ukrainians to discover that Bandera spent the duration of the war in prison, as he figured prominently in Nazi and Soviet propaganda. No mention was made of his imprisonment. Far from being in a German prison, "Bandera arrived in Ukraine in a German panzer" and "paid a `solemn visit' to the Germans in a special train."[2]

In Soviet propaganda Bandera was the very incarnation of evil; he was the successor to Petliura, the leader of the Ukrainian National Republic, who himself had been painted as a bandit and pogromchyk (pogrom perpetrator) in Soviet propaganda following the Civil War. As the organ of the Red Army on the south-western front declared: "Twenty-three years ago Wilhelm gave the orders and Petliura signed them. Today, it is Hitler who gives the orders and Bandera who signs them. The names are different, but the contents are the same."[3] Another article in the same newspaper presents this theme somewhat more colourfully:

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[1] Volodymyr Honcharenko, (ed.) Spovnenyi liubovi ta dobra... (Filled with love and goodness)(Cherkasy, 1990), p. 51.

[2] "Soviet Leaflet Directed Against the Ukrainian Nationalists" (25 June 1943) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 155.

> The cannibal Hitler has let loose his faithful dogs --- the Petliurists, the OUN-ists and the Hetmanists --- these vile traitors of the Ukrainian nation, and ordered them to impede the partisan movement through lies and murder and to liquidate the prominent patriots of our fatherland ... For all the lies, provocations and murders, the freedom-loving Ukrainian people have but one answer to the blue-and-yellow[4] band and its leader Stepan Bandera: Death![5]

To give the impression that the nationalist partisans were nothing more than small bands attached to otamans or warlords, the various partisan groups were referred to as Banderivtsi, Mel'nykivtsi, or Bul'bivtsi.[6] The UPA attempted to retaliate against Soviet wartime propaganda directed against Bandera by relating their version of his activities.[7]

While the Bolsheviks claimed that Bandera and the OUN were German agents, the Germans claimed that "[t]he OUN is a tool of Jewish Bolshevism ... The secret orders and instructions which we have captured show that the Kremlin Jews are in a league with the OUN, which claims to be fighting against Bolshevism ... The OUN and Bolshevism are one and the same --- that is why both must be destroyed."[8] As for the "Ukrainian bandit leader," the Germans claimed to have uncovered evidence that Bandera was to be

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[3] K. Polonnyk, "Hunters and Greyhounds," Za radians'ku Ukrainu no.5 (9 August 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 68.

[4] The colours of the Ukrainian national flag.

[5] Oleksander Korniichuk, "Death to the Traitors of Ukraine," Za radians'ku Ukrainu, no. 1 (31 July 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, pp. 63-64. See also, Semen Skil's'kyi, "The dog has not satisfied his master," Za radians'ku Ukrainu no.5 (9 August 1941) in ibid., p. 68.

[6] Taras Bul'ba was the nom de guerre of the nationalist partisan Taras Borovets'. His partisan group, which first used the name UPA, was forcibly incorporated into the OUN(B)'s partisan units which subsequently took the name UPA.

[7] See the section entitled "The Truth about Stephan Bandera" in the UPA's English language publication (no author) To Brotherly Czech and Slovak Nations (n.p., 1947), in Litopys UPA, v. 17, p. 138.

[8] "German Leaflet Directed Against the Ukrainian Nationalists," in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 154.

"solemnly appointed senior Bolshevik of Soviet Ukraine," by Stalin himself, if he continued to "fight with his bandits in the forests and marshes against Europe."[9]

The Formation of a Legend

Following the war the group surrounding Bandera continued to possess ideological affinities with the Nazis. The OUN in Ukraine, however, and the revisionists in the OUN abroad, rejected authoritarianism and hero-worship. Just as the Nazi party created a "Hitler myth," Bandera's party build a "Bandera myth."[10] It is likely that the Hitler myth served as a model for the OUN(B)'s myth making, although Eastern Europe provided several possible sources of inspiration. While Hitler's cult was at its zenith during his lifetime (roughly between 1938-39), the OUN leader's cult peaked following Bandera's death.

As with the Hitler myth, the Bandera myth was built upon a foundation of existing popularity.[11] In Bandera's case, his initial popularity stemmed from his performance at the Warsaw trials --- even before the outbreak of war he was a symbol of national resistance. When the akt was proclaimed in L'viv under his orders, he was accepted by many in Western Ukraine as the new national leader; although Iaroslav Stets'ko was officially the head of the new Ukrainian state, oaths of loyalty were sworn to Bandera throughout the towns and villages of Western Ukraine.[12] When Bandera was arrested by the Germans, the OUN distributed leaflets demanding his release,[13] and even organized petition campaigns.[14] Furthermore, the slogan "Long live Stepan Bandera!" was constantly mouthed by OUN and later UPA activists, and was frequently found in OUN propaganda.[15] Even the songs of the UPA partisans frequently mentioned Bandera.[16] Accordingly, although Bandera's ideological framework was abandoned by his party in Ukraine, throughout the war the OUN and the UPA both continued to gain political capital from his name. At the same time, Soviet and German propaganda's focus on Bandera, and the use of the term "Banderivtsi" to describe UPA partisans, left the impression in the minds of Ukrainians that, for better or worse, Bandera must have been an important man.

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[9] Von dem Bach (SS-Obergruppenführer and General of Police), "Ukrainians in the Forests! The German Reich is speaking to you in the name of Europe and its Great and Ancient Culture" (propaganda leaflet) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 156.

[10] The best work on the Hitler myth is Ian Kershaw's The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1987).

[11] Kershaw, Hitler Myth, p. 57.

[12] Chief of the Security Police and the SD - Report on Events in the USSR no. 78 (Berlin, 9 September 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 75.

[13] Chief of the Security Police and SD - Report on Events in the USSR no. 56 (Berlin, 18 August, 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, p. 72

[14] Chief of the Security Police and SD - Report on Events in the USSR no. 78 & no. 79

It was only after Bandera's death, however, that his party and his friends began to construct a Bandera myth in earnest. This can be explained partly by their need to establish themselves as the legitimate leaders of the emigre nationalist community --- if they could demonstrate that Bandera was a great nationalist hero, and a symbol of the nationalist struggle, then, as the successors of Bandera, they were the legitimate leaders of the nationalist cause.

In a 1960 article in Samostiina Ukraina, Stepan Kuropas notes that "one would have thought that after the fall of the cults of personality of Mussolini and Hitler, there would no longer be a place for personality cults in Ukraine." Yet, the article laments, Dontsov not only works tirelessly to build the Bandera cult, but denounces, with his poison pen, anyone who refuses to accept the authority of Bandera and his cult. In America Bandera's party was even attempting to force other Ukrainian nationalists, through bombastic decrees, to mourn Bandera's death.[17]

(Berlin, 9 & 10 September, 1941) in Kosyk, The Third Reich, pp. 75-76.

[15] Iskra, "Bii v seli Hrybotovi," (The battle in the village of Hrybotiv) II, nos. 5-6(8-9) Chornyi lis, p. 40. in Litopys v. 4. Chornyi lis (Black forest) was the UPA's underground journal.

[16] "Sanyk: Insurgent Banner --- A Collection of Revolutionary Songs" in Litopys UPA, v. 12; Leonid Poltava, Obraz Stepana Bandery v literaturi i mystetstvi (Picture of Stepan Bandera in literature and art) (New York, 1979), pp. 9-12.

[17] Stepan Kuropas, "Kul't osoby chy spravy?" (A cult of individuals or of a cause?) Samostiina Ukraina no. 1-2 (132-133) (January-February 1960), p. 15.

The author of the article located with accuracy the major founders of the Bandera cult: Dontsov and Bandera's party. Shortly after the OUN leader's death, Dontsov wrote a fiery article which at once proclaimed Bandera a righteous symbol of the national struggle, and denounced Bandera's revisionist critics. To the rhetorical question "Why was Bandera killed?" Dontsov replied that he was killed not because he posed an immediate physical threat to the Soviet state but because

> ...ever since the war his name became a symbol (even in the eyes of his enemies) of the struggle for life and death with rapacious conquerors. Because this name (Bandera - banner) could become, at a crucial moment for the tyranny, a banner under which all the brave, all those in Ukraine that are honourable, all those who have not fallen under the spell of enemy propaganda, all those who did not bend their backs under the weight of the international russophile mafia, could unite.[18]

For Dontsov, Bandera was one of the last noble, chivalrous warriors dedicated to fighting the "forces of the antichrist ---the Russian Empire." He was also one of Dontsov's only true sons --- until the very end Bandera remained loyal to Dontsov's uncompromising nationalism; Dontsov rewarded Bandera for his loyalty by giving his faithful disciple immortality.

While Dontsov and others worked to build the Bandera myth, Bandera's party's rivals had no comparable, charismatic leader to glorify for the benefit of their movements. Mel'nyk was a dignified gentleman, but he was not particularly charismatic, and his life was hardly the stuff of legends. Even though Lev Rebet, one of the leaders of the OUN(B)'s revisionist faction, was assassinated by the KGB shortly before Bandera, his supporters made no attempts to build a "Rebet myth," as such a tactic would have run counter to the revisionists' rejection of fascist and Soviet personality-cults.[19] Hence,

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[18] Dmytro Dontsov, "Im"ia-symvol, (Name-symbol) Homin Ukrainy, XI, no. 47(548) (14 November, 1959), p. 2.

[19] Krychevs'kyi, OUN v Ukraini OUN(z) i ZChOUN, p. 14.

Bandera's party alone was able to capitalize on a cult of its leader.

The Mythological Hero

Petro Mirchuk, the author of the only full-length official biography of Bandera, does not shroud his intention to create a hagiography of a nationalist saint: "For Christians, the `Lives of the Saints' were and are sources of strength, which inspire and strengthen faith." For nationalists, he continues, the lives of "great, Ukrainian nationalist-revolutionaries," should, in a similar fashion, serve as models for young nationalists; "With this goal I give the Ukrainian reader a short biography of one of the greatest Ukrainian nationalist-revolutionaries --- the leader of the OUN, Stepan Bandera."[20]

The myth of Bandera is enduring in part because his life ---especially as it is presented by his party biographers ---possesses all of the necessary ingredients for the creation of a classical hagiography; his story may be made to fit the pattern of adventures common to all mythological heroes. This lends the myth a universal and religious air. Joseph Campbell, one of the world's most noted experts on myths, argues that all mythological heroes follow a similar pattern of adventure; this pattern, like all myths, is rooted in the human psyche.[21] Consequently, the Bandera myth has an innate psychological appeal; especially to those who accept the irrational and romantic features of integral nationalism. As Campbell himself admits, there are no precise or iron-clad formulas in hagiographies. One may justifiably choose to place certain epochs of Bandera's life into different stages of the model. One may even select a somewhat different model. Still, it is worth demonstrating how Bandera's life --- as it is presented by his party hagiographers and friends --- may be placed into Campbell's model.

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[20] Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, p. 9.

[21] Joseph Campbell, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (Princeton NJ, 1949)

According to Campbell, the mythological hero is usually born in obscurity, in a small village, and must suffer a long period of obscurity, and struggle against impediments.[22] Like Christ, Bandera was born in a small village, and his childhood years are described as being fraught with obstacles, such as childhood arthritis, and the constant dangers of the war. Bandera was, as Hitler's supporter's described their Fuehrer, "the man from the people."[23] But, as Campbell adds, the makers of legend are usually not content to imagine their heroes as less than perfect from the beginning; accordingly, the tendency is to imagine the hero as having been born with extraordinary powers.[24] Bandera is therefore presented as having been a nationalist activist from a very early age, almost from birth (naturally, his childhood fascination with Lenin and the Russian nihilists is not mentioned by any of his official biographers).[25]

After his obscure and difficult childhood years, continues Campbell, the mythological hero voluntarily proceeds to the threshold of adventure. There he encounters a shadow presence that guards the passage, which he may either defeat or conciliate. If he is defeated he descends into the kingdom of the dark and is crucified or dismembered.[26] For Bandera, his battle is against the Polish state, and in defeat--- at the Warsaw trial --- he narrowly escapes execution or "crucifixion," but is condemned to a life in dark prison, with his legs bound in chains.

Beyond the threshold, then, the mythological hero journeys through a world of strange forces and challenges, some of which serve as tests for him.[27] The great test placed before Bandera, before he reaches the pinnacle of his journey, is the challenge from his fellow nationalists --- Mel'nyk and his cohorts. Shrewdly recognizing that Mel'nyk and his supporters were wolves in sheep's clothing --- enemies of the nationalist cause pretending to be its supporters[28] --- Bandera passes the test and continues onwards towards his own apotheosis.

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[22] Ibid., p. 326.
[23] Kershaw, Hitler Myth, p. 79.
[24] Campbell, Hero, p. 319.
[25] Mirchuk, Stepan Bandera, p. 9. Mirchuk's description of Bandera's youth is obviously based on Bandera's own description in his "Moi zhyttiepysni dani."
[26] Campbell, Hero, p. 246.
[27] Ibid.

The proclamation of the akt, brought about by the will of Bandera, and celebrated by his people, is the zenith of Bandera's mythological journey: by overseeing the revival of Ukraine's statehood --- the nationalist equivalent to the attainment of nirvana --- Bandera earns his place in the pantheon of Ukrainian heroes, alongside Khmel'nyts'kyi, Mazepa and Petliura. As Campbell puts it, the hero attains "his own divinization."[29]

The final epoch in the life of the hero is the return to the spiritual world. If the powers have blessed the hero, he now sets forth on the final stage of his life under their protection; if not, he flees and is pursued. In the last episode of the mythological hero's life, the hero becomes a "world-renouncer" and an ascetic; the death of the hero epitomizes the entire sense of his life. Of course, since a hero would be no hero if he feared death, he is reconciled with the grave.[30] But although he may enter the "kingdom of dread" he is then resurrected and "the boon that he brings restores the world."[31]

Bandera is pursued by his enemies --- the Soviet Russians --- and, although the OUN leader knew that the KGB was plotting his demise, claims his comrade Roman Malashchuk, Bandera did not want body-guards; he only accepted their presence under strong pressure from his friends. Bandera was resigned to his fate: "Whatever happens,

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[28] This is Bandera's retrospective view of this challenge. See Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu," p. 172.
[29] Campbell, Hero, p. 246.
[30] Ibid., pp. 354; 365.
[31] Ibid., p. 246.

happens," he told his comrades.[32] Accepting and awaiting his destiny in peace, Bandera spent the last years of his life living in the most simple, humble and "spartan" surroundings.[33]

With his death Bandera is resurrected as a "symbol of the nation." As such he emboldens his people and inspires them in their liberation struggle--- this is the "boon" he brings, the Ukrainian nation's salvation. As the poem "Nad mohyloiu Bandery" (On Bandera's Grave) proclaims:

> The beautiful legend remains,
> Of your unbreakable courage,
> Which will carry all to happiness
> And freedom will kindle the stars![34]

Bandera dwells in the Valhalla of national heroes, alongside other nationalist saints such as Mazepa and Petliura --- the work of these nationalist saints hastens the coming of heaven on earth:

> And shout your vow of loyalty to the heavens,
> To Mazepa, Petliura and Bandera:
> --- Your spirits resurrect millions, for all eternity,
> Your soul stands before us, a banner-like cross,
> As a symbol of the new, statehood-era![35]

Since the name "Bandera" is also the Spanish word for flag or banner, many of the hundreds of poems about Bandera frequentl. use this as a literary device to convey the theme that Bandera is the symbol of the nation--- he is the banner, or flag, under which nationalists rally in the struggle for statehood.

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[32] Roman Malashchuk, "Den' ostannii" (The final day) Homin Ukrainy, XII, no. 1-2(555-556) (7 January 1960), pp. 6, 12.

[33] Omelian Kushpeta, "Znav ioho osobysto" (I knew him personally) Literaturna Ukraina no. 3(4464) (23 January, 1992), p. 6.

[34] Vira Vorsklo, "Nad mohyloiu Bandery" (On Bandera's Grave), in Leonid Poltava Obraz Stepana Bandery v literatur i mystetstvi, p. 34.

[35] Leonid Poltava, "Na smert' S. Bandery" (On the death of S. Bandera) (1959), in Leonid Poltava, Obraz Stepana Bandery, pp. 15-16. The theme that Bandera as a symbol will bring about Ukraine's liberation is also present in many of the other poems found in Leonid Poltava's collection. See, for example, (anonymous) "Bezsmertnomu" (To the immortal), p. 25; Petro Kizko, "Nad mohyloiu providnyka," (At the grave of the leader) p. 21.

Thus, as in the case of the Hitler myth, the leader was viewed as the symbol of the nation. Virtually every eulogy, biographical essay, or poem dealing with the martyred providnyk makes this point. Yet he was more than a symbol to rally around, he was, in a metaphysical sense, an embodiment of the national will, of the nation's "life-force." As noted, this romantic conception of the national leader was a feature of all integral nationalist movements. But, long after the Second World War, the OUN(B), in keeping with its allegiance to integral nationalist principles, was advancing a heroic image of their leader which seemed to belong to another era --- the 1930s.

While the Bandera myth was largely a product of Bandera's party, and was elaborated most fully after his death, Bandera himself was conscious of his future role in Ukrainian mythology. Having orchestrated the beatification of Bilas, Danylyshyn and others; having witnessed the rise of his personal fame during his own life-time; and recognizing that his responsibility for the akt would earn him comparisons with Mazepa and Petliura, Bandera knew that he was destined for the pantheon of nationalist heroes. He also knew that this would advance the nationalist cause. In his brief autobiography he even provided material demonstrating his near perfection: he was a dedicated nationalist from the very beginning; he was involved in many nationalist groups at once; he participated in sporting activities; he went to church regularly and even sang in the choir; he "did not smoke or drink alcohol."[36] In short, according to his own testimony, he was a model nationalist, and a very moral man.

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[36] Bandera, "Moi zhyttiepysni dani," p. 5.

The Psychological and Social Basis of the Bandera Myth

To appreciate fully the appeal of the Bandera myth, one must consider more than Bandera's dramatic life story, and the myth-building activities of his supporters: there are deeper reasons, rooted in human psychology, for the success of personality cults such as the Bandera or Hitler myth. In his classic study The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility[37], Sidney Hook explains why a society's yearnings for security and greater happiness manifest themselves in hero-worship. According to Hook, the psychological sources of interest in great men include the need for psychological security, and the tendency to seek compensation for personal and material limitations by association with great leaders.[38] Because many people do not outgrow their dependence on their father figures --- parents, teachers or other dominant figures in their lives, who foster and instruct --- there is always a willingness to seek out a leader who talks and acts like a father-figure. In times of social and political upheaval, the prevailing mood of insecurity translates into an even stronger tendency to grasp for personal security by resigning oneself to the leadership of a paternalistic hero.[39] Added to this, in the case of twentieth-century Eastern Europe, the ideology of integral nationalism, as noted, preached the voluntary and unswerving allegiance to the national leader, who was the representative of the national will. In Western Ukraine, and among the post-war emigre community, the traumas of war and occupation, and the failure of the national liberation struggle, made West Ukrainians particularly vulnerable to the cults of nationalist heroes, of men who promised security and national salvation.

Each hero-myth is also unique, in that it derives from a particular culture. The Bandera myth's appeal in Western Ukraine also stemmed from its promise to address the specific yearnings of his people. As Hook argues, "[t]he type of satisfaction sought" by a people through identification with a hero, "is derived from the values of their culture."[40] In a sense, the Bandera myth is just as much a product of the West Ukrainian people as it is a product of Bandera's life --- it is a reflection of their desire for independence, their tenacity in the independence struggle, and their willingness to take bold, if reckless, measures to attain such independence. Only a myth which corresponded to their aspirations and their character could have been accepted so widely, and so enthusiastically. And even while Bandera's wartime drive for independence ended in unmitigated disaster, the intense desire for a nationalist saviour was weightier in their eyes than the burden of his failure --- as Hook puts it, "for those who believe, the substance of things hoped for becomes the evidence of things not seen."[41]

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[37] Sidney Hook, The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility (Boston, 1943).

[38] Ibid., p. 20.

[39] Ibid., p. 21.

Another reason for popular interest in heroes is connected with the education of children. The history of each nation is transmitted to its youth by relating the exploits of national heroes, both mythical and real. This in part stems from the dramatic effect of presenting history as a series of personal adventures, but it also reflects the simplest approach to communicate moral lessons and history. This approach was further reinforced by the propaganda of the OUN, which religiously paid homage to nationalist heroes such as Mazepa and Petliura.

Stepan Bandera: Beneath the Myth

If, as argued, the popular image of Bandera is largely a mythical construct, in part arising from Western Ukrainian aspirations, and modeled by his party hagiographers upon universal paradigms, how is one to determine what sort of man Bandera truly was? How can one believe the testimony of people who make such statements as "in him one could simply not find human flaws"?[42] Unfortunately, one can do no more than attempt to separate, after careful analysis, what appears to be myth-making from what are the genuine recollections of those who knew him. Naturally, this is a difficult task. The inaccessibility of Bandera's personal correspondences poses severe limitations upon the writing of his biography.[43]

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[40] Ibid., p. 23.
[41] Ibid., p. 21.

One feature of Bandera's leadership style was his willingness to work collectively with like-minded comrades. According to the recollections of S. Mechnyk, a member of Bandera's post-war provid, Bandera listened and paid attention to the opinions of the other members of the provid. Several of Bandera's important decisions, were made, claims Mechnyk, only after careful consultation with his colleagues.[44] Yet, while Bandera was willing to work collectively with the like-minded, he was intolerant of those who had a different understanding of the nationalist cause. He painted all opponents of his "revolutionary" conception of the liberation struggle in the same brush-strokes. Even though the Mel'nyk group and the Bandera group were formerly united in one party, for Bandera, "The fact that the group of Andrii Mel'nyk continued under the name OUN in substance, this does not even slightly change the fact that they stood, conceptually and through their deeds, in the camp of the opponents of the OUN, in the camp of socialist-conciliators..."[45] As for the revisionists within his own branch of the OUN, Bandera followed Dontsov's argument that they had fallen under the influence of Soviet politics during the war and were leaning towards Marxism; they had to return to the true revolutionary path.[46] For Dontsov and Bandera's supporters, Bandera's unwillingness to accept the ideological revisionism which took place during the war was a proof of his unwavering moral fortitude, of his "revolutionary steadfastness," in contrast to the morally dubious revisionists, who were willing to adapt their beliefs to suit the times.[47] Bandera's opponents, on the other hand, argued that Bandera lacked mental flexibility, and could not adapt to the realities of the struggle.[48]

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[42] Iuliian Zablons'kyi, "Stepan Bandera --- symvol doby," Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, VII(XIII), no. 10/82(156)(October, 1960), p. 1093.

[43] One can only hope that Bandera's party will someday follow the example of the KGB, and open its archives to historians.

[44] S. Mechnyk, Pochatok nevidomoho, p. 231.

[45] Bandera, "V desiatu richnytsiu," p. 172.

[46] Dmytro Dontsov, "Za iaku Ukrainu?" Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, viii, no. 7(93) (July, 1955), pp. 22-26. See also Bandera, "Proty fal'shuvannia vyzvol'nykh pozytsii," p. 322-338; "Chomu ne diishlo do poiednuiuchoi dii "triiky"? (Why did the unifying activities of the

It is still impossible to prove that Bandera gave orders to liquidate his nationalist rivals, such as Senyk and Stsibors'kyi. What is known for certain is that he ruthlessly ordered the death of Poles, Russians, and Ukrainian "collaborators" while leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine in the 1930s. In the early post-war period, Bandera's intolerance for ideological diversionists manifested itself in unsuccessful attempts to suppress the publications and criticisms of the revisionists.[49]

Without charisma and passion, leaders rarely become worshipped and idealized by their supporters. As noted, during his bold stand during the Warsaw trial, a reporter from the Ukrainian media suggested that Bandera belonged in a different category from his colleagues: he was a genuine fanatic, who would spare nothing for his cause. I.K. Hvozdyk, a former comrade of Bandera's, recalls that Bandera's boundless enthusiasm for the Ukrainian liberation idea was contagious. Bandera was able to "hypnotize his listeners" with his nationalism for "he himself burned [with passion for the nationalist cause] and set others afire."[50]

Bandera's friend Klymyshyn fondly recalls Bandera as a talented and capable man

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"troika" bear no fruit?) Perspektyvy, pp. 316-321.

[47] See Dontsov, "Imia-symvol."

[48] See Rebet, Svitla i tini OUN, pp. 110-111; Krychevs'kyi (Il'nyts'kyi), OUN v Ukraini, pp. 19, 24-41.

[49] Ibid., p. 22.

[50] I.K. Hvozdyk, "Tak mav umerty Stepana Bandery" (Stepan Bandera had to die thus), Vyzvol'nyi shliakh, XI(XVII), no. 10(200) (October, 1964), p. 1018.

with a dual nature. When dealing with OUN business, Bandera was serious, to the point, and strict about adhering to proper conspiratorial procedures. But afterward he became light-hearted and jovial, making use of his talent for puns and word-plays.[51] Klymyshyn also recalls that Bandera treated his comrades paternalistically. For example, Bandera once upbraided Klymyshyn for not eating a hearty enough lunch, and for not taking proper care of himself.[52] Another of Bandera's comrades recalls that back in the 1930s, when Bandera was a student in L'viv, and head of the OUN in Western Ukraine, he was an amiable, jocular and lively character, and was accordingly well known and liked in student circles. These personal qualities translated into a personal approach to leadership, in contrast to his rival Mel'nyk's militaristic and hierarchical approach, which, as noted, offended many of the younger members of the OUN.

Thus, to like-minded fellow nationalist-revolutionaries, Bandera was a good friend, and a firm, fatherly leader. This earned him their affection and unswerving loyalty: after his death, they never passed up opportunities to condemn those who, in their eyes, defamed their friend. To his enemies, however, Bandera was capable of all types of intimidation and violence. This in part explains why he is recalled by some with intense fondness, and with hatred by others.

Bandera in Post-war Soviet Propaganda

While Bandera's emigre successors continued to elaborate upon the Bandera cult, the Soviet regime set about re-inventing Bandera in another manner. In his landmark work on Ukrainian nationalism Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationalities Policy: 1957-1972, Kenneth Farmer demonstrates how "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was the prime symbol used by the Soviet regime to discourage nationalist dissidence and criticism of the state's nationalities policy. In Soviet usage, the term "bourgeois nationalism" was synonymous with integral nationalism and fascism, which themselves were synonymous with brutality and cruelty. By using the term bourgeois nationalism to describe any attempts at preserving or developing Ukrainian culture, such efforts were immediately discredited. As Farmer argues, the symbolic content of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism is the activity of the OUN. Numerous books and articles which detailed alleged atrocities of the OUN, and their collaboration with the German regime, constantly "unmasked" bourgeois nationalists as "disgusting traitors, agents of foreign imperialism, and condemned enemies of the Ukrainian people."[53]

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[51] This "dual-nature" is commented upon by V. Bezkhlibnyk, who served in Sachsenhausen prison camp with Bandera. V. Bezkhlibnyk, "Iz spomyniv pro sl.p. S. Banderu: u voienni dni," Homin Ukrainy, XII, no. 2(555-556) (7 January, 1960), p. 6.

[52] Klymyshyn, V pokhodi do voli, p. 112.

Just as the Soviet regime would sometimes change the lyrics of popular nationalist songs, making them pro-Soviet, the regime would change the content of nationalist symbols, using them to combat Ukrainian dissent. While some Ukrainian national symbols, such as the poets Taras Shevchenko and Ivan Franko, could be co-opted by the regime and presented as proto-Soviet, the symbol of Stepan Bandera, who was so adamantly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, was transformed into a purely negative symbol, equivalent to Hitler. What Kenneth Farmer fails to mention in his otherwise excellent study of Ukrainian nationalism is that, while the regime's concept of bourgeois nationalism was a powerful symbol, Stepan Bandera was in turn the personification of this notion. Indeed, as noted, the "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists" were often referred to simply as "Banderivtsi," or Bandera's followers. As one Soviet journalist puts it, Bandera's name was generally regarded as a "synonym for arson, diversions, plunder; an expression of all that is most criminal."[54]

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[53] Literaturna hazeta, (24 May, 1957), as quoted in ibid.

[54] V. Maslovs'kyi, "Bandera: prapor chy banda?" (Bandera: banner or bandit?) Radians'ka Ukraina (14 October, 1990). A similar image of Bandera was presented by historians in Soviet satellite states, such as Poland, where Bandera was "a synonym for wickedness, criminality, arson and plunder." Edward Prus, Herosi spod znaku tryzuba (False heroes

National Resurrection

In the late 1980s, the repression of the old Soviet system was eased. The stage was thus set for the revival of Ukrainian nationalism. This revival began cautiously under the auspices of innocuous organizations such as the People's Movement for Perestroika (Rukh, or Movement), or the Memorial historical society and various student organizations such as the Hromada, the Ukrainian Students' Association (USS) (both based in Kiev), and the L'viv Student Brotherhood (SB). As part of their attempts to revive Ukrainian national consciousness, and to combat the de-nationalizing results of the Soviet system, these organizations began to re-examine Ukrainian history, paying particular attention to the activities of Ukrainian nationalists during the Second World war.[55] They soon came to reject the traditional Soviet conception of "bourgeois nationalism"; since Bandera was the personification of this concept, discussions concerning the OUN's historical legacy often took the form of a debate over the life and activities of Stepan Bandera. As the nationalist and student organizations rehabilitated Bandera in their publications, and even began commemorating his life, this naturally raised the ire of the still powerful Communist and traditionalist journalists, and of Communist Party leaders, such as Hurenko, the former First Party Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The glorification of Bandera was, in their eyes, akin to glorifying Hitler. The Soviet wartime version of Bandera, which cast him as a vile collaborator and sadist, was updated marginally at this time. Most of the arguments resembled those of the past, although they were presented with more sophistication and less flamboyant rhetoric --- Bandera, like Mel'nyk, was a German agent; after the war he was an agent of British and American imperialism; he died not at the hands of a Soviet agent, but because of his conflicts with the German government, or because of

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under the sign of the trident) (Warsaw, 1985), p. 116.

[55] David R. Marples, "New Interpretations of Ukrainian History," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, no. 11, 12 March 1993, pp. 57-61.

suicide.[56]

While Orthodox communists were, by the late 1980s, willing to admit to the crimes of Stalin, they continued to raise the spectre of "bourgeois nationalism" to discredit the new nationalist movement. When in the summer of 1990, Ukrainian students went on a hunger strike in Kiev, demanding several concessions in the direction of Ukrainian autonomy, old-guard Soviet journalists missed no opportunity to demonstrate the students' ties to the OUN, to Bandera, and to "bourgeouis nationalism." They took special care to ridicule the students for their attempts to rehabilitate Bandera.

In an article attempting to explain the causes of the student strike, Pravda Ukrainy angrily rejected the students' claims that "Bandera's forces were never stooges of the Germans." In the newspaper's view, one could only object to such a claim "since it is contrary to well-known facts and to the testimony from the fascists themselves." And what can one expect from these new nationalists, the article asks? "Nothing but dictatorship! `Our rule must be terrifying'[57] --- this concept of their ideologist and idol [Bandera] is well known."[58] In a similar vein, another orthodox journalist reminded the striking students of the OUN's supposed slogan "Long live Hitler! Long live Bandera!"[59] Thus, by 1990

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[56] The following articles are typical example of the orthodox press' hostile reaction to the rehabilitation and glorification of Bandera: "Navishcho Banderi p"iedestal?" (Why a pedestal for Bandera?) Robitnycha hazeta, (14 December, 1990). P. Vasylynka, "Kudy rukhaiets'ia RUKH?" (Where is Rukh moving to?) Prapor komunizmu, (20 August, 1991); V. Vasylenko, "I ni odna sl'oza ne vpala: iak buly zaprodani khloptsi" (And not a single tear was shed: How the boys were sold) Robitnychna hazeta (13 November, 1990). Of the essays by this school, the most detailed and well researched examination of Bandera's activities is V. Maslovs'kyi, "Bandera: prapor chy banda," Radians'ka Ukraina, (16 October, 1990).

[57] This quote is frequently attributed to Bandera by Soviet sources. Bandera's supporters deny that he had ever said such a thing. See, for example, S. Mechnyk, Pochatok nevidomoho, p. 231.

[58] "Dyvimsia pravdi v ochi," (Let's look truth in the eye). Pravda Ukrainy (25 October, 1990), p. 2.

[59] V. Vasylenko, "I ni odna sl'oza ne vpala: iak buly zaprodani khloptsi," p. 3. In this article, as with many of the articles directed against Bandera, the highly suspect NKVD interrogation of Nazi Erwin Stolz is used to demonstrate Bandera's and Melnyk's alleged

Stepan Bandera was the focus of a polemical battle between orthodox communists and the new generation of Ukrainian nationalists. But the efforts of the traditional Soviet journalists had no success in stemming the rising tide of nationalism.

The Bandera Myth in Contemporary Ukraine

Throughout Eastern Europe, the revival of nationalist cults, with their accompanying heroes, has filled the vacuum left by the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. It is as if parts of Eastern Europe were placed in a "deep-freeze" in the 1940s, and then thawed out over the past several years. In Croatia, for example, the leaders of that country's wartime fascist party, the Ustasa, have been rehabilitated, and glorified by nationalists.[60] In Ukraine, the quasi-religious cult of Ukrainian nationalism, which Bandera helped to create in the 1930s, has also been revived. Significantly, the faithful are not simply drawn from the old generation of nationalists, which took part in the wartime nationalist struggle. The younger generation of Ukrainians, especially students, have played a predominant role in the revival of nationalist rituals. Student organizations such as the "Dmytro Dontsov Club" have been formed --- even an organization called SNUM (Spil'ky Natsionalistychnoi Ukrains'koi Molodi [Union of Nationalist Ukrainian Youth]), echoing the name of the 1930s student organization, has been established.[61] These organizations celebrate nationalist heroes in a manner not unlike the SUNM of the 1930s, except that they have a new nationalist saint ---Stepan Bandera.

One of the first events signalling the emergence of the Bandera cult in Soviet

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status as German agents. See, for example V. S. Koval', "Shcho take OUN i khto taki banderivtsi" (What is the OUN and who are the Banderivtsi) in Zakhidna Ukraina: pershe desiatyrichchia pislia viiny (Kiev, 1988), pp. 13-22; V. Maslovs'kyi, "Bandera: prapor chy banda" Radians'ka Ukraina, (16 October, 1990).

[60] Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London, 1992), pp. 82-83; "Fascist Remembered," Globe and Mail no. 44, 671 (10 February, 1993), p. 46.

[61] Roman Zbaraz'kyi, "Prykarpattia sviatkuie rokovyny UPA," Halychyna no. 147(306) (15 October, 1991), p. 2.

Ukraine was the unveiling of a statue of the OUN leader in the home of his birth, Staryi Uhryniv, in the summer of 1990. The monument was blessed by the archbishop of the Ukrainian Byzantine-Catholic Church, Pavlo Vasylyk, who, in a speech to the assembled crowd, extolled the righteousness and selfless patriotism of the OUN leader. The heroic myth established by Bandera's party after his death permeated nationalist newspaper articles surrounding the occasion of the monument's unveiling. For example, the poem "On the Death of S. Bandera," by Leonid Poltava, one of the founders of the myth, found a new audience in an article describing the celebrations.[62] Articles by Bandera's chief party hagiographer, Petro Mirchuk, also began to appear in West Ukrainian newspapers, such as Za vilnu Ukrainu.[63] Thus, the revival of the cult of Bandera in Ukraine has been aided by the energies of the original manufacturers of the myth. But attempts to glorify Bandera did not go unnoticed by opponents of Ukrainian nationalism: the monument was demolished by unknown culprits; after it was rebuilt, it was again destroyed.[64]

Youth and the Bandera Cult

In the city of Ivano-Frankivs'k, a year after the unveiling of the monument in Staryi Uhryniv, groups of students belonging to the new nationalist youth organizations placed flowers at the planned site of a memorial to Bandera on Stepan Bandera Street (formerly Lenin Street). In November 1992, the plaque was unveiled amidst great ceremony, reminiscent of the 1930s.[65] But Ukrainian nationalist student organizations did not merely adopt the superficial appearance of the pre-war nationalists, they also voiced approval of its revolutionary stand. On 30 June, 1990, at a L'viv rally commemorating the akt, O. Vitovych, one of the representatives of the new SUNM proclaimed that:

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[62] Volodymyra Sakvuka, "Narod vshanovuie heroia," (The nation honours a hero) Za vil'nu Ukrainu (16 October, 1990), pp. 1-2.; Ihor Hulyk, "Staryi Uhryniv: v Ukrainu vertaiut' syny" (Staryi Uhryniv: sons return to Ukraine), ibid.

[63] See, for example, Petro Mirchuk, "Muchenyts'ka smert' brativ Stepana Bandery," Za vil'nu Ukrainu, no. 111 (22 June, 1991), p. 2.

[64] Stepan Bandera (Grandson of Stepan Bandera), interview, (Toronto, 7 September 1992); Associated Press, 11 July 1991.

[65] Bohdan Vivchar, "Dukh, shcho tilo rve do boiu," (The spirit that carries the body to battle) Halychyna no. 158(317) (5 November, 1991), pp. 1, 4.

> These ideas for which Stepan Bandera fought are still valid today. The idea of a nationalist, revolutionary movement in Ukraine. We, the young generation of nationalists, take these ideas into our defense.[66]

While the young supporters of extremist Ukrainian nationalism may have been following the example of their parents (as in Western Ukraine), the nationalist youth movement's enthusiasm for Bandera was also an expression of self-conscious extremism and reaction. Adopting Bandera as a hero, and accepting his revolutionary ideology, was a natural expression of rejection of the Soviet regime, and of youthful rebellion. Bandera's program of nationalist revolution --- of a fight for complete independence at any cost, of resorting to violence and terror when necessary --- naturally tends to appeal to youthful maximalism: this in part explains Bandera's importance as a symbol in Ukrainian youth culture.

After the failed putsch in Moscow in August 1991, which precipitated Ukraine's declaration of independence, Bandera's legacy was utilized by supporters of independence to demonstrate the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. No doubt Bandera himself would have been pleased to know that thirty years after his death the akt was being used as pro-independence propaganda in his homeland.[67] In November of 1991 a "Day of Statehood" was celebrated throughout Western Ukraine --- the nationalist holy days connected with various declarations of independence were again being celebrated; of course, Bandera's akt was included as one of these "great days of the struggle."[68] With the coming of independence, the heroic image of Bandera has spread beyond the borders of Western

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[66] V. Maslovs'kyi, "Bandera: Prapor chy banda?"

[67] For example, shortly before the referendum on Ukrainian statehood in December 1991, independence supporters presented the akt as proof of Ukraine's tradition of statehood. The director of the Institute of National Rebirth, Ihor Hereta, noted that a Ukrainian state was proclaimed in L'viv under the direction of Stepan Bandera, and against the will of the German-Fascist occupiers. This, he argued, along with the periods of independence under Petliura and others, demonstrated that the Ukrainian people had a tradition of statehood, and of struggling for statehood. Ihor Hereta, "Chy bula Ukraina derzhavoiu" (Was Ukraine Ever a State?) Halychyna no. 173(332) (27 November, 1991), p. 1.

[68] "Den' derzhavnosti na Prykarpatti," (Day of statehood in the Carpathian Lands) Halychyna no. 158(317) (5 November, 1991), p. 4.

Ukraine; even reputable publications such as the Kiev-based Literaturna Ukraina, have begun to present a heroic image of Bandera.[69] Thus, the heroic image of Stepan Bandera created by his party after his death is well established in Western Ukraine, and is making inroads in Eastern Ukraine. At the same time, his legacy remains a lighting rod for controversy throughout the country.

The Price of Immortality

While Bandera may have earned his place in Ukrainian nationalist mythology (or in infamy, in the minds of others), he and his family paid a heavy price for this immortality. Bandera himself lost his life at the hands of a KGB assassin because he was a symbol of "bourgeois nationalism." While alive Bandera was unable to enjoy a normal family life: his own daughter, Natalka, did not even know that her father was Stepan Bandera until the age of thirteen.[70] Bandera's wife was emotionally destroyed by her husband's murder, and was unable even to testify at the trial of Bandera's assassin.

The loss of their father was only the beginning of the hardship and sorrow for Bandera's children. After living for decades in a perpetual state of terror, their mother died in Toronto in 1978. Bandera's son Andrii, who edited a party newspaper in Toronto died at the age of thirty-eight, in 1984. His sister Natalka passed away only a year later at the age of 43. After the death of both of her parents and both of her siblings, Bandera's only surviving child, his daughter Lesia, grew profoundly paranoid and fearful, and suffered a mental breakdown. It seemed to her that someone was conspiring to wipe out the entire Bandera clan.[71]

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[69] See for example the following article, under the section heading "Warriors for Ukrainian independence": Omelian Kushpeta, "Znav ioho osobysto" (I knew him personally) Literaturna Ukraina no. 3(4464) (23 January, 1992), p. 6. "Ziznannia vbyvtsi," ibid.

[70] "Slovo Natalky Bandery" (The speech of Natalka Bandera [at the trial of Stashins'kyi]), in Moskovs'ki vbyvtsi Bandery, p. 305.

[71] Stepan Bandera, interview, (Toronto, 7 September 1992).

At another level, Bandera's children had to deal with the burden of being the mortal children of an "immortal." Andrii Bandera felt this pressure keenly. He reacted to the boundless hero-worship accorded his dead father by rejecting the very concept of hero-worship. He would often quote the poem by Symonenko, cited at the beginning of this chapter. In his mind, the dead should serve the living, not vice versa.[72] Andrii's son, Stepan, is also grappling with his grandfather's legacy; as he says, with a melancholy grin, the name is "quite a cross to carry."[73]

While for Bandera's political successors (the present leadership of the OUN) Bandera exists only as a symbol, he is still regarded by his surviving family members as a brother and father. The gap between these two conceptions of Bandera has taken the form of a struggle over the fate of his material remains. While his family wants his remains re-interned in the tiny village of his birth, the party would prefer his remains re-interred in a pantheon to nationalist heroes in Kiev.[74]

Conclusion

At a very early age, Stepan Bandera became intoxicated by the mystique of revolutionaries and terrorists. By the time he left the small Western Ukrainian village of his birth, an intense hatred of Russia had also embedded itself in his consciousness. He developed an extremist nationalism that was characteristic of his era and of his generation --- it was at once a product of Ukraine's political situation, and a proposed solution to it: if the interest of the nation was placed above all else, above questions of class or religion; if moral scruples were put aside in favour of ruthless and decisive action, then the national struggle, which had faltered under the preceding generation, would finally end in victory. The new Ukrainian nationalism found its most elaborate expression in the works of the Dmytro Dontsov. Dontsov explained to his disciples how an elite group of nationalists, not restrained by moral scruples, could awaken the masses to nationalist revolution, and thus throw off the yoke of Ukraine's deadliest foe, Russia. Dontsov's program of revolution formed the basis of Bandera's plan of action; for the rest of his life, Bandera remained intellectually bound to Dontsov. The two men needed each other: Dontsov preached action, yet was himself confined to theorizing. Bandera, on the other hand, was the consummate man of action who saw no need to tread beyond the intellectual pastures staked out by Dontsov.

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[72] Yuri Shymko, "Andriy Bandera - Promoter of Ukrainian Causes," Ukrainian Echo, viii, no. 6(75) (29 August, 1984), p. 3.

[73] Stepan Bandera, interview, (Toronto, 7 September 1992).

[74] Ibid.

Bandera's childhood fascination with revolution merged with Dontsov's conception of national liberation: through the work of an "initiative minority," the party, and the party's propaganda, the masses would be "activated" and thus spurred on to national revolution. Only through such a popular nationalist revolution could Ukraine gain its independence. Consequently, in Bandera's mind propaganda and politics were almost synonymous --- his propaganda was the key to the success of the revolution. It, in turn, relied heavily on symbols and rituals. Such tactics were a common feature of all fascist and integral nationalist movements in Eastern Europe at this time. Through such tactics, traditional morality could be replaced with a new integral nationalist morality which placed the Ukrainian national liberation struggle before all else. As the head of the OUN's propaganda section, and later as leader of the OUN in Western Ukraine, Bandera gained first-hand knowledge of the efficacy of symbols, such as nationalist martyrs, and of quasi-religious rituals as nationalist propaganda. In particular the trial and subsequent martydom of Bilas and Danylyshyn made for potent propaganda, and served as a model for Bandera in later years. It also served as a precedent for Bandera's own beatification by his party. When finding himself on trial as a terrorist, Bandera determined to set himself before the

Ukrainian nation as a nationalist martyr. This was the first building block in the development of the Bandera myth.

After escaping from prison in Poland Bandera's personal animosity towards and ideological differences with the emigre leadership of his party helped precipitate a split in the OUN. After consolidating the forces of his new party, the OUN(B), he set about making preparations for another propaganda coup --- the proclamation of Ukrainian independence in German occupied Western Ukraine. Whether or not it could move beyond paper, the akt, as a symbol of the renewal of Ukrainian statehood, was intended as an addition to nationalist mythology --- a new holy day in the nationalist calendar. The OUN leader's personal connection to the akt served as the second building block in the Bandera myth. After the war, Bandera and his party colleagues glorified the akt to consolidate their positions in the post-war nationalist emigration. In itself, the akt also stands as a symbol, in Ukrainian historiography, of the revival of Ukrainian statehood. Such symbols have become increasingly important as Ukrainian historians seek to demonstrate the historical legitimacy of their newly obtained independence. Hence, aside from his own role as a myth, Bandera was responsible for the creation of another myth, the akt.

With his death, Bandera's party and Dontsov began in earnest to convert Bandera's political prominence into a full fledged hero-myth. This further solidified the position of the OUN(B) relative to the "revisionists" within the OUN and the other nationalist political groups in the emigration. The myth that they created drew from universal hagiographical patterns, yet at the same time it was an expression of Ukrainian national aspirations. The OUN leader's real-life political failures could not tarnish the appeal of the Bandera myth --- by identifying with the myth, a nationalist could feel psychologically closer to personal and national salvation.

In the last half-century the symbol of Bandera may have helped shape the Ukrainian identity. At the same time, it was utilized by the Soviet regime as the embodiment of "bourgeois nationalism," a semi-mythical concept of the regime used to discredit all manifestations of Ukrainian identity.

In 1991 Ukraine became an independent state. One can hardly doubt that Bandera would have been overjoyed by this occurrence. At the same time, one can be certain that if Bandera were alive today he would be very dissatisfied with the present regime, which is led by a former Communist Party ideologue (Leonid Kravchuk, the President), and dominated by former Communists. Indeed, Bandera's political successor --- the present leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Slava Stets'ko (the wife of Iaroslav Stets'ko) bluntly stated her disdain for the regime of Leonid Kravchuk in a speech in Kiev in the summer of 1992.[75] While it is difficult to judge whether the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists has a future in Ukraine, one can be certain that as long as it survives it will continue to use the symbol of Stepan Bandera to advance its interests.

Aside from supporting the remnants of the OUN, what role can the Bandera myth play in an independent Ukraine? As Joseph Campbell argues, in the modern world nationalist cults and the "numerous saints of this anti-cult --- namely the patriots whose ubiquitous photographs, draped with flags, serve as official icons" serve to promote mistrust and hatred towards other nations and national groups. This is because the world outside of the individual nation is outside the protection of their god:

> The laws of the city of God are applied only to his in-group (tribe, church, nation, class, or what not) while the fire of perpetual holy war is hurled (with good conscience, and indeed a sense of pious service) against whatever uncircumcised, barbarian, heathen, "native," or alien people happens to occupy the position of neighbour.[76]

Because Ukraine has lagged so far behind other European nations in achieving statehood, and because the level of national consciousness is so low in the eastern regions of Ukraine, the Bandera myth may still serve a constructive role in promoting a common national identity. Yet in the very regions where such a myth could be constructive (i.e., Eastern Ukraine), it is less effective because the name Bandera is so strongly associated with Western Ukraine's history and its resistance to Soviet rule ---an experience not shared by Eastern Ukrainians. In these russophone regions of Ukraine, West Ukrainians are perceived as dangerous extremists. And when one considers Bandera's profound antipathy towards the Russian nationality, his memory can hardly promote harmony between Ukrainians and the substantial Russian minority in Ukraine. Among Western Ukrainians, whose national identity is already well developed, the Bandera myth is today more likely to feed a nationalist xenophobia.

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[75] Marta Kolomayets, "Kravchuk Threatens Foreign Critics," Ukrainian Weekly vol. LX, no. 35 (30 August 1992), pp. 1, 7.

[76] Campbell, Hero, pp. 388-389.

Nonetheless, for better or for worse, Bandera will remain an enduring part of Ukrainian history: as a myth he is a component of the Ukrainian national psyche --- as well as a reflection of it --- and his life story will remain a vehicle for communicating the nationalist interpretation of Ukrainian history.

While many may recoil at Bandera's lack of enthusiasm for liberal and humanistic principles, he is indeed --- as his party never failed to point out --- a symbol of the nationalist struggle against Polish, Soviet and German rule in Ukraine. In the minds of nationalist Ukrainians this epic struggle is the very fabric of twentieth-century Ukrainian history. So one can hardly doubt that the myth of Bandera will continue to dwell in the consciousness of the Ukrainian people.

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